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CONSENT, APPROPRIATION BY MANIPULATION, AND
THE 10-YEAR CHALLENGE: HOW AN INTERNET MEME
COMPLICATED BIOMETRIC INFORMATION PRIVACY
Michael J. Slobom*
ABSTRACT

In 2019, a viral Internet meme called the “10-Year Challenge”
flooded social-media newsfeeds, asking users the question: “How hard did
aging hit you?” Users responded by sharing side-by-side photographs of
themselves from 2009 and 2019 with their followers. While the challenge
spread across social-media platforms, commentators began speculating
about the challenge's origins after a writer for Wired magazine published an
op-ed questioning whether Facebook used the challenge to train its facial
recognition technology. The op-ed argued that the challenge, while
seemingly harmless, could provide Facebook with a sufficient dataset to
train its facial recognition technology on age progression. While Facebook
denied playing a role in generating the challenge, the op-ed poignantly
observes the chilling possibility of tech companies using manipulative tactics
to compel disclosure of otherwise private information.
This Article examines the potential remedies available to
consumers who have been manipulated into surrendering their biometric
data. Using the 10-Year Challenge as a test case, this Article assesses the
viability of the causes of actions currently available to consumers who have
surrendered their biometric data as a result of manipulative, or at least lessthan-forthright, data-collection tactics and concludes that neither commonlaw tort claims nor recently enacted biometric privacy laws at the state level
provide adequate protection from campaigns designed to manipulate
consumers into surrendering their private information. Congress must
address these types of tactics when crafting broader federal privacy
legislation; this Article proposes a legislative starting point.
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1153

A. An Overview of Biometrics and Facial Recognition
Technology ......................................................................... 1157

II. PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY ................... 1158
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I. INTRODUCTION
Internet memes have emerged as a primary method of communication
in the age of social media. 1 Social-media users create and share memes to
evoke humor or irony, to spread political messages, and to participate in
online challenges, among other purposes. 2 In January 2019, a new viral
meme flooded social-media newsfeeds. What later became known as the
“10-Year Challenge” asked social-media users to answer the question “How
hard did aging hit you?” by sharing side-by-side photographs of themselves
from 2009 and 2019. 3 Over 5.2 million users participated in the challenge,
with some users providing their audiences with helpful context behind the
photos, such as the dates and locations of when and where the photos were
taken. 4
Speculation over the challenge’s origins quickly arose when Kate
O’Neill, a writer for Wired magazine, published an op-ed questioning
whether Facebook engineered the challenge. 5 O’Neill argued that the
challenge, while seemingly harmless, could provide Facebook with a clean
dataset sufficient to train its facial recognition technology on age
progression:
Imagine that you wanted to train a facial recognition algorithm on
age-related characteristics and, more specifically, on age
progression (e.g., how people are likely to look as they get older).
Ideally, you’d want a broad and rigorous dataset with lots of
people’s pictures. It would help if you knew they were taken a
fixed number of years apart—say, 10 years.
Sure, you could mine Facebook for profile pictures and look at
posting dates or EXIF data. But that whole set of profile pictures
could end up generating a lot of useless noise. People don’t
reliably upload pictures in chronological order, and it is not

Perry Kostidakis, The Evolution of Memes, COMPLEX (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2D6anMw [https://perma.cc/2TNE-V6VF].
See This Is Where Internet Memes Come From, MIT TECH. REV. (June 11, 2018),
https://bit.ly/349tT75 [https://perma.cc/YA3D-52VK] (noting Internet memes have also
been used “to spread aggressive or racist messages and to incite hatred”).
See Rebecca Jennings, Why You’re Seeing the 10-Year Challenge Everywhere, VOX (Jan.
16, 2019), https://bit.ly/2QStyOp [https://perma.cc/2YFJ-GM3R].
Nicole Martin, Was the Facebook ‘10 Year Challenge’ A Way to Mine Data for Facial
Recognition AI?, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2019), https://bit.ly/2GJSPZZ [https://perma.cc/B8R6J46M].
See Kate O’Neill, Facebook’s ‘10 Year Challenge’ Is Just a Harmless Meme—Right?,
WIRED (Jan. 15, 2019), https://bit.ly/2CmCK8L [https://perma.cc/PDN9-VNT6].
1

2

3

4

5
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uncommon for users to post pictures of something other than
themselves as a profile picture. 6
O’Neill’s piece quickly gained traction. Within days, various media
outlets, including NPR, The New York Times, Forbes, and Vox, also ran
pieces questioning Facebook’s use of the challenge. 7 The Forbes piece even
quoted one scholar who characterized the challenge as a “perfect storm for
machine learning.” 8
While Facebook denied playing a role in generating the challenge, 9
O’Neill’s theory does not fall outside the realm of possibility given
Facebook’s history of surreptitiously exploiting its users’ data. 10 And even if
the challenge was not an attempt at social engineering, O’Neill’s op-ed
poignantly observes the chilling possibility of tech companies—such as
Facebook with its more than two billion users 11—using seemingly harmless
campaigns as pretext for compelling the disclosure of otherwise private
information. 12
Id. EXIF stands for Exchangeable Image File Format. EXIF data is information that is
recorded and stored within an image file when a photograph is taken and contains details
about when, where, and how the photo was taken. See Thomas Germain, How a Photo’s
Hidden ‘Exif’ Data Exposes Your Personal Information, CONSUMER REP. (Dec, 6, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2XJEJjK [https://perma.cc/6EUA-MXS9]. Critics questioned O’Neill’s
premise, arguing that because Facebook already has access to the photos it does not need to
manipulate users into re-posting the images. See Kate O’Neill (@kateo), TWITTER (Jan. 13,
2019, 9:46 AM), https://bit.ly/2DIGphT [https://perma.cc/W76Z-NTP2] (“Most common
rebuttal in my mentions: ‘That data is already available. Facebook's already got all the profile
pictures.’”). In response, O’Neill pointed out that many Facebook users do not upload
photos immediately after the photos were taken and many users’ profile pictures display
images not of themselves, but of cartoons and animals. See Martin, supra note 4.
Amanda Morris, Could The 10-Year Challenge Be Putting Your Data At Risk?, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Jan. 20, 2019), https://n.pr/2RF4eAJ [https://perma.cc/LQC4-8SUZ]; Jacey
Fortin, Are ‘10-Year Challenge’ Photos a Boon to Facebook’s Facial Recognition
Technology?,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
19,
2019),
https://nyti.ms/2X4pSgY
[https://perma.cc/H3ZY-FYUC]; Martin, supra note 4; Jennings, supra note 3.
Martin, supra note 4.
Facebook (@facebook), TWITTER (Jan. 16, 2019, 3:08 PM), https://bit.ly/2MfytZ4
[https://perma.cc/JP9C-VUP9] [hereinafter Facebook Response].
See Elizabeth Dwoskin et al., Facebook Allegedly Offered Advertisers Special Access to
Users’ Data and Activities, According to Documents Released by British Lawmakers, WASH.
POST (Dec. 5, 2018), https://wapo.st/2X2HI3T [https://perma.cc/5LFF-SXKS] (describing
internal Facebook emails that suggest Facebook used users’ data as a bargaining chip to
attract advertisers).
See Fortin, supra note 7.
Similar concerns arose again in July 2019 when FaceApp, an app that can edit photos of
people’s faces to show younger or older versions of themselves, went viral. See Thomas
Brewster, FaceApp: Is The Russian Face-Aging App A Danger To Your Privacy?, FORBES
(July 17, 2019), https://bit.ly/2KRsdaG [https://perma.cc/PL5G-ER2G]. While the majority
6

7

8
9
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These concerns underscore the cries of information privacy law
scholars for federal legislation recognizing a right to privacy in one’s own
biometric data. 13 Biometric identifiers are intrinsic physical and behavioral
human characteristics, such as fingerprints, DNA, iris patterns, voice, gait,
and facial geometry. 14 Both state and private actors collect and store
biometric information in databases designed to assist with identifying or
verifying peoples’ identities. 15 Facebook, for example, has collected and
stored facial biometrics using facial recognition technology since 2010. 16
Facial recognition technology measures the curves of a person’s face on a
sub-millimeter scale and then matches the measurements to other images
stored in a database or on a device. 17 Common measurements include the
distance between eyes, width of the nose, depth of the eye sockets, shape of
the cheekbones, and length of the jaw line. 18 According to Facebook’s
Deputy Chief Privacy Officer, Facebook uses the data strictly for improving
user experience (i.e., making the “tagging” feature more user friendly,
preventing online impersonation, and assisting people with visual
of concerns initially raised proved untrue, FaceApp’s viral moment nevertheless
demonstrated “how quickly millions of faces could be gathered up for nefarious purposes.”
Chip Brownlee, How Worried Should You Be About FaceApp?, SLATE (July 18, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2qvQXhN [https://perma.cc/5C6L-MJL8].
See, e.g., Hannah Zimmerman, The Data of You: Regulating Private Industry's Collection
of Biometric Information, 66 KAN. L. REV. 637, 656–71 (2018); Carra Pope, Note &
Comment, Biometric Data Collection in an Unprotected World: Exploring the Need for
Federal Legislation Protecting Biometric Data, 26 J.L. & POL’Y 769, 797–802 (2018); Yana
Welinder, A Face Tells More than a Thousand Posts: Developing Face Recognition Privacy
in Social Networks, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 165, 197 (2012) (“Federal legislation is more
desirable . . . .”); Lisa J. McGuire, Comment, Banking on Biometrics: Your Bank’s New
High-Tech Method of Identification May Mean Giving Up Your Privacy, 33 AKRON L. REV.
441, 476–80 (2000).
Biometrics,
ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER
FOUND.,
https://bit.ly/2TJoUES
[https://perma.cc/78LW-RJAT].
13

14

See id.
See Camila Domonoske, Facebook Expands Use of Facial Recognition to ID Users in
Photos, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Dec. 19, 2017), https://n.pr/2Bmdkdt [https://perma.cc/C9UF15
16

NL92]. In September 2019, Facebook announced that it would no longer automatically
collect its users’ facial biometrics and would instead turn on its facial recognition technology
only when a user opts in. See Srinivas Narayanan, An Update About Face Recognition on
Facebook, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Sept. 3, 2019), https://bit.ly/2QKyDMv
[https://perma.cc/TX2T-AHP2].
See Kevin Bonsor & Ryan Johnson, How Facial Recognition Systems Work,
HOWSTUFFWORKS, https://bit.ly/2jqAbZQ [https://perma.cc/PL67-NCPT]; Facial
Recognition, FIND BIOMETRICS, https://bit.ly/2t8z5qB [https://perma.cc/D6UA-TW48]
[hereinafter Facial Recognition]. For a discussion of facial recognition technology, as well as
other biometric technology, see infra Part I.
Bonsor & Johnson, supra note 17.
17

18
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impairments). 19 Meanwhile, critics have pointed out that Facebook also uses
facial recognition “to support its research into artificial technology, which
Facebook hopes will lead to new platforms to place more focused targeted
ads.” 20
While the U.S. government has acknowledged the highly sensitive,
private nature of biometric data, 21 no federal statute currently regulates its
collection or use by private actors. 22 Thus, absent state statutory
protections, 23 consumers are left to resort to common-law claims. Even still,
actors who profit from collecting consumers’ biometric data can arguably
dodge liability by simply disclosing their data-collection practices in welldrafted terms-of-service agreements 24—even when consumers have
surrendered their data as a consequence of an actor’s manipulative tactics. 25
This Article examines the potential remedies currently available to
consumers manipulated into surrendering their biometric data to interested
data collectors. Using the 10-Year Challenge as a test case, this Article
assesses the viability of the most relevant common-law and statutory causes
of actions as well as the state statutory protections that do not afford private
rights of action. This Article argues that neither common-law tort claims,
nor state biometric privacy laws adequately protect consumers against
campaigns designed to manipulate disclosure of biometric information.

See Rob Sherman, Hard Questions: Should I Be Afraid of Face Recognition Technology?,
FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Dec. 19, 2017), https://bit.ly/2AtZq3T [https://perma.cc/MTQ2TCL6].
Jared Bennett, Saving Face: Facebook Wants Access Without Limits, CTR. FOR PUB.
INTEGRITY (July 31, 2017), https://bit.ly/2BuTb3a [https://perma.cc/CRB8-YX5F].
See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB MEM. NO. 0716, SAFEGUARDING AGAINST AND RESPONDING TO THE BREACH OF PERSONALLY
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION 1 n.1 (2007), https://bit.ly/2I9a8G1 [https://perma.cc/AVL4XJDR] [hereinafter OMB MEMO] (including “biometric records” in the category of
“personally identifiable information”).
See Biometric Data and the General Data Protection Regulation, GEMALTO (Aug. 20,
2018), https://bit.ly/2SrudI3 [https://perma.cc/QSK4-7CYE] [hereinafter Biometric Data].
Id. Currently, only Illinois, Washington State, and Texas have passed laws regulating the
collection of biometric information. Of the three states that have passed such laws, only
Illinois provides individuals with the right to sue for damages. Jason P. Stiehl et al., New
Biometric Information Privacy Cases Reveal Breadth of Potential Exposure for Companies,
LEXOLOGY (Mar. 5, 2018), https://bit.ly/2URU9xu [https://perma.cc/9NUU-3MZB].
For instance, Facebook discloses its use of facial recognition technology to create facial
recognition templates in its data policy. See Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://bit.ly/1wYGJjt
[https://perma.cc/QS6G-399J]. Agreeing to Facebook’s data policy is a precondition to using
Facebook’s products. See Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://bit.ly/1mAamz3
[https://perma.cc/49CR-K3PY].
See infra Section III.A.2, III.B.2.
19
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This Article then argues that future federal privacy legislation must address
these types of tactics.
Part I of this Article first provides an overview of biometric
technologies, including the technologies’ primary functions. It then
discusses how private entities use biometric technologies and the value of
collecting, storing, and distributing individuals’ biometric traits. 26 Part II
overviews the right to privacy, including its origins and the common-law tort
claims that emerged therefrom. Part II also provides a brief overview of
constitutional privacy protections, focusing primarily on the intersection of
Fourth Amendment privacy interests and modern technology. Using the 10Year Challenge as a test case, Part III assesses the viability of causes of action
currently available to consumers who have suffered privacy injuries as a
result of private companies’ manipulative data-collection tactics, which this
Article refers to as “appropriation by manipulation.” Section III.A examines
the most pertinent privacy tort—appropriation of name or likeness 27—and
demonstrates how that tort provides an insufficient safeguard against
appropriation by manipulation in the biometric-data context. Section III.B
briefly overviews existing state biometric privacy statutes and demonstrates
how those statutes, in current form, do not adequately protect consumers
against appropriation by manipulation in the biometric-data context. Finally,
Part IV proposes a starting point for addressing these concerns through
broader federal biometric privacy legislation.

A. An Overview of Biometrics and Facial Recognition Technology
“Biometrics” is a term used to refer to either characteristics or
processes. 28 As characteristics, biometrics refers to a person’s “measurable
biological (anatomical and physiological) or behavioral aspects . . . that can
be used for automated recognition.” 29 As processes, biometrics refers to
This author does not claim to be an expert in biometric technologies. Instead, Part I’s
overview of biometric technologies is based on research and discussions with people familiar
with the technology.
Although there is an argument to be made for addressing the applicability of the intrusion
upon seclusion tort, see Carmen Aguado, Comment, Facebook or Face Bank?, 32 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. REV. 187, 215–16 (2011), it is not sufficiently strong enough to warrant
consideration in this Article. The intrusion upon seclusion tort focuses on the “solitude or
seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977). By posting photographs to Facebook, users remove
information from the private sphere into the public sphere, thus making the information
public.
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, PRIVACY & BIOMETRICS: BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL
FOUNDATION 4 (2006).
26

27

28

29

Id.
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“automated methods of recognizing an individual based on” those
characteristics. 30 “Biometric technologies” are the technologies that perform
the biometric processes. 31
II. PRIMARY FUNCTIONS OF BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGY

A. Identification and Verification
Biometric technologies perform two main functions: identification and
verification. 32 Biometric identification is the process of comparing an
individual’s biometric data to a number of biometric “templates” stored in
a database, 33 with the goal of answering the question “Who are you?” 34 For
instance, Facebook’s now-abolished “Tag Suggestions” feature 35 used facial
recognition technology to identify its users. The technology first analyzed a
single face appearing in a photograph and then compared the facial
30
31

Id.
See The Future of Biometric Technology: Convenience or Privacy?, THOMSON REUTERS

(June 2, 2017), https://tmsnrt.rs/2qkpoHt [https://perma.cc/VYC6-2F9S].
See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 11. In addition to these primary
functions, biometric technologies also perform a “categorization” function. See infra Section
I.A.2. The categorization function is less common.
ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, OPINION 3/2012 ON DEVELOPMENTS IN
BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES 5 (2012), https://bit.ly/2nzLzbf [https://perma.cc/MPT5-2L92]
[hereinafter DPWP MARCH 2012 OPINION]. Identification is referred to as “one-to-many”
or “1:N” identification because the single dataset is compared to many different biometric
templates linked to many different individuals. See The Difference Between 1:N, 1:1, and
1:Few and Why It Matters in Patient ID, RIGHTPATIENT (Sept. 23, 2015),
https://bit.ly/2nxF74y [https://perma.cc/EE7M-54KZ] [hereinafter The Difference Between
1:N, 1:1, and 1:Few].
See Ian E. Muller, Identification vs Verification: What’s the Difference?, VERIDIUM (July
12, 2018), https://bit.ly/2mFE02H [https://perma.cc/6R5X-N7N4].
In September 2019, Facebook announced its plan to replace the Tag Suggestions feature
with a broader “face recognition setting.” See Narayanan, supra note 16. The Tag Suggestions
setting was enabled by default and used facial recognition technology to automatically suggest
tagging other users in photos posted to Facebook’s platform. See id. The new face
recognition setting requires users to “opt in” to Facebook’s use of facial recognition
technology and provides additional services. See id. In addition, Facebook claims that if a
user chooses to disable the face recognition setting, then Facebook will delete that user’s face
template from its database. See What Is the Face Recognition Setting on Facebook and How
Does It Work?, FACEBOOK HELP CTR., https://bit.ly/37H5eJc [https://perma.cc/JK4CCXS9] [hereinafter Facebook Face Recognition]. Facebook implemented the change after
the Federal Trade Commission imposed a $5 billion fine on the company, citing Facebook’s
practice of enabling the Tag Suggestions feature by default while suggesting to consumers
that Facebook’s facial recognition technology was opt in. See Blake Montgomery, Facebook
Makes Facial Recognition Opt-In Instead of Automatically Scanning Users’ Faces, DAILY
BEAST (Sept. 3, 2019), https://bit.ly/2MN2UIh [https://perma.cc/2PW8-NMNR].
32

33

34

35
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biometrics with all previously stored facial biometrics to determine the
identity associated with the face in the photograph. 36
Biometric verification, on the other hand, verifies a person’s identity
by comparing his or her biometric data with a single biometric template
stored in a database or on a device. 37 Much like a PIN or password,
biometric verification is used to answer the question “Are you who you say
you are?” 38 For instance, Apple’s “Touch ID” allows iPhone users to unlock
their iPhones and authorize iTunes Store purchases by verifying the users’
identities using a fingerprint reader built into the phone’s home button. 39
A short overview of a typical biometric system’s data-collection, datastorage, and data-comparison processes demonstrates how these functions
work. Generally, three components of a typical biometric system perform
the collection and storage processes:
1. A sensor that observes characteristics and converts the
observations into data that can be stored in electronic form.
2. Signal processing algorithms that perform quality control
activities on the collected data and develop [a] biometric template
[of the subject] . . . .
3. A data storage component that manages all of the data
collected, including data from the initial and all future collections
and processing. 40
By way of example, facial recognition technology uses sensors to
capture images of a person’s face and identify numerous, distinguishable
“landmarks,” such as points on the chin, nose, and cheekbones (i.e., the
observation phase). 41 After capturing the images, which can be gathered
through both 2D images, such as photos and videos, and 3D facial scans, 42
Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1268 (9th Cir. 2019) (discussing the mechanics of
Facebook’s Tag Suggestions feature); see also April Glaser, Facebook Will Tell You How
to Turn Off Facial Recognition. Why Wait?, SLATE (Sept. 3, 2019), https://bit.ly/2munKlm
[https://perma.cc/H9YM-CVPR] (“By recognizing faces and suggesting users tag their friends
and themselves in uploaded photos, the company has built what could be the largest nameto-face database in the world.”). Although not much information regarding Facebook’s new
face recognition setting has been made available, the new setting likely uses the same
processes, consistent with other facial recognition technology. Accord Bonsor & Johnson,
supra note 17.
See DPWP MARCH 2012 OPINION, supra note 33, at 6.
See Muller, supra note 34.
See Use Touch ID on iPhone or iPad, APPLE, https://apple.co/1ZVD2Jf
[https://perma.cc/PSY7-36XM].
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 4 (emphasis added).
See Bonsor & Johnson, supra note 17; Steve Symanovich, How Does Facial Recognition
Work?, NORTON, https://nr.tn/2GGM0W7 [https://perma.cc/4PPN-E2C8].
See Bonsor & Johnson, supra note 17.
36

37

38
39

40
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the technology measures various distances between the landmarks (i.e., the
conversion phase). 43 The system then aggregates those measurements into a
numerical code that comprises a person’s “faceprint” (i.e., the biometric
template component). 44 The system then stores the subject’s faceprint in a
database (i.e., the data storage component) that it later accesses to compare
with new images. 45
The identification and verification functions occur at the comparison
stage. Generally, two components of a typical biometric system perform the
comparison process: (1) “[a] matching algorithm that compares the new
biometric template to one or more templates that may already be stored”;
and (2) “a decision process (either automated or human-assisted) that uses
the results from the matching component to make a system-level decision.” 46
A system verifying a person’s identity compares the person’s new biometric
template to a previously stored biometric template associated with that
individual (i.e., a “one-to-one” comparison), while a system that identifies a
person compares that person’s new biometric template to many previously
stored biometric templates associated with many different individuals (i.e.,
a “one-to-many” comparison). 47 A match between the new template and the
previously stored template completes the identification or verification
process. 48
Today’s biometric technologies use various physiological and
behavioral characteristics to perform identification and verification
processes. The most implemented and studied biometric modalities 49 are
fingerprint, facial, iris, voice, signature, and hand-geometry recognitions. 50
These modalities nevertheless vary in accuracy and efficiency. For instance,
facial recognition is a relatively efficient method of identifying and verifying
43
44

See id.; Symanovich, supra note 41.
Bonsor & Johnson, supra note 17; Symanovich, supra note 41.

The process of storing an individual’s faceprint in a biometric database for the first time is
known as “enrollment.” ARTICLE 29 DATA PROT. WORKING PARTY, OPINION 02/2012 ON
FACIAL RECOGNITION IN ONLINE AND MOBILE SERVICES 2 (2012), https://bit.ly/2o7vWrT
[https://perma.cc/6C7B-EG4U].
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 4–5.
Id. at 7–10; The Difference Between 1:N, 1:1, and 1:Few, supra note 33.
See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 28, at 4–5.
The term “biometric modalities” refers to categories of biometric systems based on the
biometric trait used to recognize an individual. See Biometrics – Modalities,
TUTORIALSPOINT, https://bit.ly/2N8P56P [https://perma.cc/3N6Y-PSK3]. Biometric
modalities fall under three types: physiological, such as fingerprint recognition; behavioral,
such as gait or signature recognition; and a combination of both physiological and behavioral,
such as voice recognition. Id.
See Danny Thakkar, Top Five Biometrics: Face, Fingerprint, Iris, Palm and Voice,
BAYOMETRIC, https://bit.ly/2OKNnq1 [https://perma.cc/CH94-2H8H].
45

46
47
48
49

50
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individuals, with technologies that allow users to capture the initial image
using a standard digital camera even at relatively far distances. 51 However,
facial recognition technology has proven to be less accurate than other
biometric modalities due to different variables that can corrupt the
biometric template (e.g., sunglasses, poor lighting, and low-resolution
images). 52 Iris recognition technology, on the other hand, provides quite
accurate results—it can even differentiate two genetically identical
individuals. 53 Nonetheless, iris recognition also has its limitations. For
instance, current iris recognition technology cannot meet its objectives from
great distances and requires the subject’s cooperation to obtain the data
necessary to build the biometric template. 54
Some biometric systems employ a “multi-modal” approach to cure
these accuracy defects. 55 Multi-modal biometric systems collect multiple
biometric traits belonging to a single person and consolidate those results to
perform the identification or verification functions. 56 For instance, a system
that combines both facial recognition and fingerprint recognition can be
considered a multi-modal biometric system. 57 By tying more traits to an
individual’s identity, the system becomes more likely to accurately and
efficiently recognize that person. 58

B. Categorization
Biometric technologies, and facial recognition technologies in
particular, have been used increasingly to perform another function:
categorization. 59 The European Union’s Data Protection Working Party has
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. For instance, the subject often must look directly into the camera capturing the iris
image. Id.
DPWP MARCH 2012 OPINION, supra note 33, at 6, 17; see also Waleed Dahea & HS
Fadewar, Multimodal Biometric System: A Review, 4 INT’L J. RES. ADVANCED

51
52
53
54

55

ENGINEERING & TECH. 25, 26 (2018). “In addition, multimodal biometric system can
effectively deal with a variety of issues such as noisy data, intra-class variations, limited degrees
of freedom, non-universality, spoof attacks, and unacceptable error rates which may be
caused by unimodal biometric systems.” See Multimodal Biometrics—A More Accurate
Identification System, IRITECH, INC. (Apr. 30, 2015), https://bit.ly/2ntTZ4f
[https://perma.cc/RMR8-7VQU] [hereinafter A More Accurate Identification System].
Dahea & Fadewar, supra note 55, at 26; DPWP MARCH 2012 OPINION, supra note 33, at
6.
See A More Accurate Identification System, supra note 55.
See id.; Dahea & Fadewar, supra note 55, at 26.
See DPWP MARCH 2012 OPINION, supra note 33, 5–6; see also Derek Hawkins,
56

57
58
59

Researchers Use Facial Recognition Tools to Predict Sexual Orientation. LGBT Groups
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defined biometric categorization as “the process of establishing whether the
biometric data of an individual belongs to a group with some predefined
characteristic in order to take a specific action.” 60 Biometric categorization
aims not to identify a person or verify a person’s identity but rather to place
biometric data into categories, such as age and gender. 61 The data can then
be stored, analyzed, and used to predict whether other people belong in that
same category. 62
A controversial 2018 study conducted by researchers at Stanford
University suggested that facial recognition technology can predict an
individual’s sexual orientation more accurately than humans can. 63 The
researchers fed more than 35,000 photographs of roughly 15,000 selfidentified gay and heterosexual men and women into an algorithm that
analyzed the subtle differences in the faces appearing in the images. 64 The
researchers then showed photographs of new faces to the software and
asked it to predict each person’s sexual orientation. 65 According to the
researchers, the results showed that the software accurately distinguished
between gay and heterosexual men eighty-one percent of the time and
between gay and heterosexual women seventy-one percent of the time. 66

Aren’t

Happy., WASH. POST (Sept. 12, 2017), https://wapo.st/2ffzvVC
[https://perma.cc/QPV6-J4QB]; Daniel Thomas, The Cameras that Know if You’re
Happy—or a Threat, BBC (July 17, 2018), https://bbc.in/2P41MP4 [https://perma.cc/K3TDEFHB].
DPWP MARCH 2012 OPINION, supra note 33, at 6.

60

See id.
See id.; see also Hawkins, supra note 59; Thomas, supra note 59.
See Yilun Wang & Michal Kosinski, Deep Neural Networks Are More Accurate Than
Humans at Detecting Sexual Orientation from Facial Images, 114 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.

61
62
63

PSYCHOL. 246 (2018). The study faced significant backlash, with some criticizing the study
for its methodology, the conclusions that the researchers drew from results, and some of the
basic assumptions underlying those conclusions. See Jeremy Howard, Can Neural Nets
Detect Sexual Orientation? A Data Scientist’s Perspective, FAST.AI (Sept. 13, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2JnRtEA [https://perma.cc/K5DU-G6S9]. LGBTQ rights groups also criticized
the study, claiming the study was based on “flawed research” and could be used by brutal
regimes across the world to persecute people believed to be gay. See Drew Anderson,

GLAAD and HRC Call on Stanford University & Responsible Media to Debunk Dangerous
& Flawed Report Claiming to Identify LGBTQ People Through Facial Recognition
Technology, GLAAD (Sept. 8, 2017), https://bit.ly/31UFUuR [https://perma.cc/9E2MG8N5]. This author expresses no view on the validity of the study but cites the study only to
demonstrate the ways in which facial recognition technology has been used to attempt to
categorize people.
Wang & Kosinski, supra note 63, at 248–49.

64
65
66

Id.
Id. at 250.
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Some biometric technologies have categorized people based on other,
less-controversial characteristics. 67 For instance, some technology
companies now claim to possess the ability to detect a person’s mood using
facial recognition technology. 68 Market-research agencies have begun using
this technology to assess consumers’ reactions to television advertisements. 69
In 2012, Walmart filed a patent application signaling the company’s intent
to use facial-recognition technology to detect customers’ moods. 70 The
Walmart technology would reportedly monitor customers’ facial
expressions attempting to identify dissatisfied customers at the checkout
lines. 71

C. Current Uses and Value of Biometrics
The ever-growing use of biometrics and biometric technology has
already begun changing the ways in which society operates. Private
companies have begun replacing traditional methods of verification with
biometric technologies, 72 and these shifts come with certain advantages. A
person might forget or share a password or PIN, or an unauthorized person
might find a key or token and use it to gain access to a person’s sensitive
information. With biometrics, these problems do not exist: people are
unlikely to lose or share fingerprints and, absent significant advances in 3DSee, e.g., Mehedi Hassan, Which Is the Most Reliable Biometric Modality?, M2SYS
BLOG, https://bit.ly/364rxHK [https://perma.cc/7VHM-DQWM] (discussing biometric
technology’s unique ability to identify people by observing behavioral and physical
attributes); Wang & Kosinski, supra note 63 (positing that people lack the ability to detect
and interpret certain revealing facial traits that machines can detect and interpret).
See Thomas, supra note 59 (discussing facial recognition technology that is designed to
detect dissatisfied customers); George Anderson, Walmart’s Facial Recognition Technology
Would Overstep Boundaries, FORBES (July 27, 2017), https://bit.ly/33X3HMg
[https://perma.cc/5FZB-FSUF] (discussing Walmart’s application for a patent on facial
recognition technology designed to detect dissatisfied customers). Amazon has touted its
facial recognition service, which is part of a larger suite of image-analysis features called
Rekognition, for its ability to detect emotions using facial recognition technology and then
placing those emotions into several categories, including “happy,” “sad,” “angry,”
“surprised,” “disgusted,” “calm,” “confused,” and, most recently, “fear.” Tom Simonite,
Amazon Says It Can Detect Fear on Your Face. You Scared?, WIRED (Aug. 18, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2JkdSTs [https://perma.cc/SA64-B5EG].
See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 59.
See Hayley Peterson, Walmart Is Developing a Robot that Identifies Unhappy Shoppers,
BUS. INSIDER (July 19, 2017), https://bit.ly/35VTrFQ [https://perma.cc/U5LN-9KBF].
67

68

69
70

71
72

Id.
See Thakkar, supra note 50 (“[Biometric] technology [has] been successfully implemented

in various real-life applications such as forensics, government agencies, banking and financial
institutions, enterprise identity management and other identification and recognition
purposes.”).
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printing technology, would-be identity thieves are unlikely to duplicate a
person’s facial geometry. 73 Even biometric identification technology
provides some advantages. For instance, biometric identification technology
has been used to recover missing persons and identify criminal suspects. 74
Other potential advantages of this type of technology include the arguable
benefit of consumer convenience and shoplifting prevention. 75
But a darker, and perhaps more insidious, side of biometrics exists.
Mobile software applications and the tech companies behind them collect
massive amounts of information about consumers each day; 76 online search
engines, such as Google, and social-media sites covertly gather and store

It should be noted, however, that at least one reporter has used a 3D-printed replica of his
own head to successfully unlock several Android phones. See Thomas Brewster, We Broke
into a Bunch of Android Phones with a 3D-Printed Head, FORBES (Dec. 13, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2JlXzW1 [https://perma.cc/U2UZ-T2KM]. The reporter could not break into
Apple’s iPhone. See id.
See Anthony Cuthbertson, Indian Police Trace 3,000 Missing Children in Just Four Days
Using Facial Recognition Technology, INDEP. (Apr. 24, 2018), https://bit.ly/2JjuUAZ
[https://perma.cc/HQW2-H8K4]; Jon Schuppe, How Facial Recognition Became a Routine
Policing Tool in America, NBC NEWS (May 11, 2019), https://nbcnews.to/2Pjo1n0
[https://perma.cc/UJ8Y-H9Y6]. This use of facial recognition technology also has its
downsides. For instance, the technology’s false-match rates disproportionately impact
women and people of color. See Steve Lohr, Facial Recognition Is Accurate, if You’re a
White Guy, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2BZ9Z2d [https://perma.cc/64ZLVLWT]. The ACLU of Massachusetts recently conducted a test using Amazon’s facial
recognition technology to determine the technology’s accuracy. See Facial Recognition
Technology Falsely Identifies Famous Athletes, ACLU MASS. (Oct. 21, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2Wb0beB [https://perma.cc/MS97-ZUVV]. According to the ACLU,
Amazon’s technology mistakenly matched 27 professional athletes’ faces to criminal
mugshots. See id. Some states have begun introducing legislation that would prohibit police
from using facial recognition technology in conjunction with body cameras. See Chris Mills
Rodrigo, California Blocks Police Body Cameras from Using Facial Recognition, HILL (Oct.
9, 2019), https://bit.ly/2BEJlv5 [https://perma.cc/65QY-UBPQ].
See Leticia Miranda, Thousands of Stores Will Soon Use Facial Recognition, and They
Won’t Need Your Consent, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 17, 2018), https://bit.ly/2JpEEJS
[https://perma.cc/YQ5S-3WTY]; Jeff John Roberts, Walmart’s Use of Sci-fi Tech to Spot
Shoplifters Raises Privacy Questions, FORTUNE (Nov. 9, 2015), https://bit.ly/31PYxAm
[https://perma.cc/6ZCN-R5EF].
See Nicole Perlroth & Nick Bilton, Mobile Apps Take Data Without Permission, N.Y.
TIMES: BITS (Feb. 15, 2012), https://nyti.ms/2MOg081 [https://perma.cc/8XFP-9XF8]
(“Companies that make many of the most popular smartphone apps for Apple and Android
devices . . . routinely gather the information in personal address books on the phone and in
some cases store it on their own computers.”).
73

74

75

76
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hundreds of millions of consumers’ facial biometrics; 77 and the motives
underlying these practices go beyond consumer convenience. 78
The federal government currently classifies biometric data as
“personally identifiable information” (PII). 79 PII is loosely defined as any
information that can be used to trace a person’s identity. 80 In addition to
Cf. Aguado, supra note 27, at 192 (“By 2009, there were more than thirty publicly available
databases for facial recognition analysis. Today, applications such as Google’s Picasa, Apple
iPhoto, Sony’s Picture Motion Browser, Windows Live Photo Gallery, and Facebook, all
use facial recognition technology.”).
See Anne T. McKenna, Pass Parallel Privacy Standards or Privacy Perishes, 65 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1041, 1067 (2013) (“[C]ollected, stored, and accessible biometric data provides vast
potential for financial gain for international, national, and local private entities.”).
See, e.g., 2 C.F.R. § 200.82 (2019) (defining “protected” PII); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2019)
(defining PII in the education context); 6 C.F.R. § 37.3 (2019) (defining PII in the
identification-card context); 41 C.F.R. § 105-64.001 (2019) (defining PII under the General
Services Administration rules under the Privacy Act of 1974); cf. 6 C.F.R. pt. 5, app. C (71)
(2019); see also OMB MEMO, supra note 21, at 1 n.1 (including “biometric records” in the
category of “personally identifiable information”).
See, e.g., 2 C.F.R. § 200.79 (2019) (“PII means information that can be used to distinguish
or trace an individual's identity, either alone or when combined with other personal or
identifying information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual.”); 32 C.F.R. § 329.3
(2019) (defining PII as “[i]nformation about an individual that identifies, links, relates, or is
unique to, or describes him or her . . . [or] which can be used to distinguish or trace an
individual's identity which is linked or linkable to a specified individual”). PII is the central
concept upon which information privacy law rests. See Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove,
The PII Problem: Privacy and a New Concept of Personally Identifiable Information, 86
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1814, 1816 (2011). The United States’ sectoral approach to privacy law has
generally focused on privacy protections of information that can be used to link information
to a person’s identity. In turn, most federal privacy statutes protect narrowly defined classes
of PII. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(2) (2018) (“No
funds shall be made available under any applicable program to any educational agency or
institution which has a policy or practice of releasing, or providing access to, any personally
identifiable information in education records . . . .”); Cable Communications Policy Act, 47
U.S.C. § 551(a)–(b) (requiring cable operators to provide consumers with notice regarding
the PII collected and prohibiting collection of PII without prior written consent); Video
Privacy Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1) (2018) (“A video tape service provider who
knowingly discloses, to any person, personally identifiable information concerning any
consumer of such provider shall be liable to the aggrieved person . . . .”); cf. Fair Credit
Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(1) (2018) (providing protections relating to “consumer
reports,” which the statute defines as “any . . . communication of any information by a
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness . . . [or] personal
characteristics” when used to establish the consumer’s eligibility for credit, insurance, or for
other defined purposes). Despite PII’s central importance to information privacy, no
uniform definition of the term exists in the United States. Shwartz & Solove, supra, at 1819.
Moreover, the American concept of PII, and the law’s reliance on PII for protecting
individuals’ privacy, has come under attack in recent years, as the digital era has proven that
even non-PII can be de-anonymized and transformed into PII. See id. at 1816 (“Increasingly,
77

78

79

80
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biometric identifiers, some of the most common examples of PII include a
person’s name, social security number, date of birth, and address. 81
Ultimately, PII can be used to tie information relating to an otherwise
anonymous individual to that individual’s identity. 82 For example, an online
retailer might have a record of a user’s transaction history. With that record
alone, the retailer could not determine who made the purchases in question.
But when the record is attached to an address, date of birth, social security
number, or name, the retailer can readily determine the identity of the
purchaser. 83
The value of PII increases demonstrably within the context of the data
brokerage industry. While there is no statutory definition for the term “data
brokers,” 84 the Federal Trade Commission has defined the term as follows:
“Data brokers are companies that collect information, including personal
information about consumers, from a wide variety of sources for the
purpose of reselling such information to their customers for various
purposes, including verifying an individual’s identity, differentiating records,
marketing products, and preventing financial fraud.” 85 These entities often
technologists can take information that appears on its face to be non-identifiable and turn it
into identifiable data.”); Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the
Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1704 (2010) (“Today, this
debate centers almost entirely on squabbles over magical phrases like ‘personally identifiable
information’ (PII) or ‘personal data.’ Advances in reidentification expose how thoroughly
these phrases miss the point.”). In response to a Federal Trade Commission call for
comments on privacy issues associated with new technologies and business models, “several
consumer and privacy groups elaborated on the privacy concerns associated with supposedly
anonymous data and discussed the decreasing relevance of the personally identifiable
information (‘PII’) label.” FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN
ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 18
(2012), https://bit.ly/3cD7Bhx [https://perma.cc/F6NX-DBK7] [hereinafter FED. TRADE
COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY].
See, e.g., 2 C.F.R. § 200.82 (2019); 34 C.F.R. § 99.3 (2019); 6 C.F.R. § 37.3 (2019); 41
C.F.R. § 105-64.001 (2019).
Accord FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 80, at 18–
22.
See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16,
2012), https://nyti.ms/2Wf1HfC [https://perma.cc/XRM6-9CUY] (discussing how Target’s
“Guest ID” links an individual’s transaction history and demographic information to the
individual’s identity).
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI. & TRANSP., 113TH CONG., A REVIEW OF THE
DATA BROKER INDUSTRY: COLLECTION, USE, AND SALE OF CONSUMER DATA FOR
MARKETING PURPOSES 1 (2013) [hereinafter A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY].
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 80, at 68. Data
brokers have operated for years. “Long before the advent of the Internet, e-mail, or the
mobile economy, data brokers developed expertise in compiling consumer data to facilitate
targeted outreach to consumers through direct mail.” A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER
81

82

83

84

85
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operate in the shadows, with consumers unaware of the types of information
being collected, the methods used to do so, and to whom it is sold. 86 In fact,
the scope of information that data brokers gather is quite broad, largely due
to the decisions people now make using the Internet. 87 Each day, “millions
of consumers . . . [use] computers, smart phones, and tablets to make
purchases, plan trips, and research personal financial and health questions,
among other activities. These digitally recorded decisions provide insights
into the consumer’s habits, preferences, and financial and health status.” 88
With consumers increasingly expanding their digital footprints and
technological advances facilitating access to the information generated, data
brokers have expanded the types of information they collect, store, and
sell. 89
Data brokers’ customers range from financial lending institutions
making credit decisions on a particular borrower to employers making
hiring decisions to retailers determining how, and to whom, to target their
advertising efforts. 90 A New York Times Magazine profile on the databroker industry found that retailers can purchase a wide swath of
information about consumer habits based on peoples’ online activities,
including:
data about your ethnicity, job history, the magazines you read, if
you’ve ever declared bankruptcy or got divorced, the year you
bought (or lost) your house, where you went to college, what
kinds of topics you talk about online, whether you prefer certain
brands of coffee, paper towels, cereal or applesauce, your
political leanings, reading habits, charitable giving and the
number of cars you own. 91

INDUSTRY, supra note 84, at 1. However, the data broker industry has grown significantly in
the wake of the digital era. Id. at 2.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 80, at 68.
A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY, supra note 84, at 1–2.
Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 1–2; FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 80, at
68.
A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY, supra note 84, at i, 8. Data brokers have a
wide range of customers. The types of customers include financial institutions, hotel chains,
wireless telephone service providers, cable companies, jewelry stores, and other data brokers
and resellers. Id. at 29.
Duhigg, supra note 83. To aid this effort, data brokers offer “predictive scoring products”
that predict a consumer’s behavior. Companies that purchase these products use them to
“assess[] which customers will receive special offers, or [to] look[] at credit risks associated
with certain mortgage applications.” A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY, supra note
84, at 8.
86
87
88
89

90

91
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Those retailers then analyze the data both to better market products to
consumers and to predict how consumers will behave in the future. 92
The data collected and sold by data brokers would be meaningless
without the links that PII provides. PII provides data brokers and interested
data collectors with the identities behind online activities. 93 A search query
or online purchase may be linked to an IP address; that IP address is linked
to a name, email address, or street address; and that name or address is
linked to the consumer. Armed with this information, retailers can analyze
the information connected to a consumer’s identity and then determine how
to capitalize on what they know about that person.
Biometrics exacerbates the concerns associated with these practices.
Consider the Walmart patent application discussed above. 94 Theoretically,
Walmart could use the same technology to instantaneously determine each
customer’s preferences by using facial biometrics to access the customer’s
purchase history and then use that information to provide targeted ads or
coupons at point of sale. 95 Indeed, some retailers have already begun using
facial recognition technology for that very purpose, surveilling and tracking
consumers from the moment they walk into the store. 96 And while social
Duhigg, supra note 83; see also A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY, supra note
84, at 8, 12–13. This information is gathered from a range of data, including consumers’
purchase and transaction information and social-media activity. See A REVIEW OF THE DATA
BROKER INDUSTRY, supra note 84, at 13–14. Data brokers gather this information from a
range of sources, including “government records and other public data; purchase or license
from other data collectors; cooperative agreements with other companies; self-report by
consumers, often through surveys, questionnaires, and sweepstakes; and social media.” A
REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY, supra note 84, at 15.
See Duhigg, supra note 83.
See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text.
The Federal Trade Commission has raised similar concerns:
In the future, digital signs and kiosks placed in supermarkets, transit stations, and college
campuses could capture images of viewers and, through the use of facial recognition software,
match those faces to online identities, and return advertisements based on the websites
specific individuals have visited or the publicly available information contained in their social
media profiles. Retailers could also implement loyalty programs, ask users to associate a
photo with the account, then use the combined data to link the consumer to other online
accounts or their in-store actions. This would enable the retailer to glean information about
the consumer’s purchase habits, interests, and even movements, which could be used to offer
discounts on particular products or otherwise market to the consumer.
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 80, at 45.
See Miranda, supra note 75; Nick Tabor, Smile! The Secretive Business of FacialRecognition Software in Retail Stores, INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 20, 2018),
https://nym.ag/2Wgo709 [https://perma.cc/LD6L-TZWR]. Many retailers use this
technology for security purposes. For instance, the facial recognition software in many retail
stores captures images of customers’ faces and compares the scanned images against a
database of known shoplifters. See Miranda, supra note 75. The cameras used to capture
92

93
94
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96

2020]

10-YEAR CHALLENGE

1169

security numbers can be changed, email accounts deleted, and birth records
sealed, it is much more difficult, if not impossible, to discard and replace a
person’s fingerprints, facial landmarks, or iris patterns. Biometrics can,
therefore, provide the inescapable means by which private entities can trace
limitless personal information back to a consumer in real time, regardless
of whether the consumer knows it is happening.
III. THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
The right to privacy stands as a pillar of individual liberty that intersects
with many distinct aspects of American jurisprudence. As a constitutional
right, the right to privacy prohibits the government from unreasonably
intruding into one’s private affairs. 97 Outside the constitutional context, the
right protects against private actors who encroach on one’s ability to be left
alone. This section provides a brief overview of the right to privacy’s origins,
the common-law tort claims that emerged therefrom, and the Supreme
Court’s endeavors to parse Fourth Amendment privacy interests within the
context of modern technology.

A. Origins and Common Law Claims
In 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published the seminal
article The Right to Privacy, 98 which has been widely credited as the catalyst
for American privacy law. 99 The article opens with an acknowledgement of
the images are not only the security cameras placed near ceilings but also cameras stored
inside digital signs and kiosks. See Tabor, supra. The latter type of camera has been used to
determine whether customers are paying attention to advertisements. Id. The advent of
“smart shelves” may further the capabilities of this technology. Smart shelves are expected to
replace current supermarket shelves and, more importantly, the labels that appear on them.
Instead of the normal paper label containing information about a product’s price, smart
shelves will be equipped with sensors that interact with customers’ mobile devices. See Lana
Bandoim, How Smart Shelf Technology Will Change Your Supermarket, FORBES (Dec. 23,
2018), https://bit.ly/2pPTkLv [https://perma.cc/X6U7-7G9G]. The technology will sift
through the information associated with that individual—including his or her purchasing
habits, Internet search history, and demographic information—and create personalized
advertisements that immediately appear on a screen on the shelf. See id. It would not be farfetched to imagine smart-shelf technology employing facial recognition technology to
perform the same tasks and, in turn, produce far more efficient and detailed results.
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (identifying a constitutionally protected
right to privacy).
Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
See Benjamin E. Bratman, Brandeis and Warren’s The Right to Privacy and the Birth of
the Right to Privacy, 69 TENN. L. REV. 623 (2002) (crediting The Right to Privacy as the
97
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the common law’s ability to progress and “grow[] to meet the demands of
society.” 100 Warren and Brandeis set forth several historic instances in which
common-law rights have evolved with societal change to protect the
underlying interests attached to those rights. 101
Citing “[r]ecent inventions and business methods,” Warren and
Brandeis argued that recent societal developments necessitated new legal
recognitions to preserve the “protection of the person”—namely, the
recognition of the “right ‘to be left alone.’” 102 The “right to privacy,” they
argued, did not constitute a new right but rather an unspoken protection
preserved by then-existing sources of law. 103 And like most rights, they found,
the right to privacy was not absolute. 104 Warren and Brandeis outlined six
limitations to the right, which included—importantly for this Article—the
right’s cessation upon the rightholder’s publication of private facts or
consent thereto. 105
The right to privacy quickly gained traction, with Georgia becoming
the first state to recognize a common-law cause of action for invasion of
privacy in 1905. 106 Today, most states recognize four torts that collectively
comprise the “invasion of privacy” cause of action: 107 (1) intrusion upon
motivating force behind the recognition of the right to privacy by several state courts and state
legislatures).
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 98, at 193.
Id. at 193–95.
Id. at 195.
Id. at 205–06. As Warren and Brandeis note:
These considerations lead to the conclusion that the protection afforded to thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions, expressed through the medium of writing or of the arts, so far as
it consists in preventing publication, is merely an instance of the enforcement of the more
general right of the individual to be let alone. It is like the right not to be assaulted or beaten,
the right not to be imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously prosecuted, the right not to be
defamed. In each of these rights, as indeed in all other rights recognized by the law, there
inheres the quality of being owned or possessed—and (as that is the distinguishing attribute
of property) there may be some propriety in speaking of those rights as property. But,
obviously, they bear little resemblance to what is ordinarily comprehended under that term.
The principle which protects personal writings and all other personal productions, not
against theft and physical appropriation, but against publication in any form, is in reality not
the principle of private property, but that of an inviolate personality.
Id. at 205 (footnote omitted).
See id. at 214 (contemplating limitations to the right to privacy).
See id. at 218.
DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 12 (6th ed.
2018); see also Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 81 (Ga. 1905) (“So
thoroughly satisfied are we that the law recognizes within proper limits, as a legal right, the
right of privacy . . . that we venture to predict that the day will come when the American bar
will marvel that a contrary view was ever entertained . . . .”).
SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 28.
100
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seclusion; 108 (2) public disclosure of private facts; 109 (3) false light; 110 and (4)
appropriation of name or likeness. 111 Scholars attribute this four-tort
conception to William Prosser, 112 whose article Privacy 113 provided the first
attempt to describe invasion of privacy in tort law. In Prosser’s view, which
later informed the Restatement (Second) of Torts’ approach, 114 privacy torts
protect against a narrow class of harm that includes mental harm and
distress, 115 reputational harm, 116 and proprietary harm. 117
Prosser’s four-tort conception persists today, as courts continue to limit
their recognition of privacy-tort claims to the four torts enumerated in
Prosser’s article and the narrow interests those torts purportedly protect. 118
Some scholars argue that this limited approach to the right to privacy has
lost touch with the times, 119 explaining that such a confined view of the
protected interests fails to account for modern technology and therefore
leaves many injuries unremedied. 120

B. Privacy and the Constitution
1. Early Foundations: Griswold v. Connecticut
While the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly reference a right to
privacy, the Supreme Court has nevertheless found the right’s subsistence
through other constitutional guarantees. Griswold v. Connecticut 121 marked
the Court’s first express recognition of a constitutionally protected privacy

108
109
110
111
112

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
See id. § 652D.
See id. § 652E.
See id. § 652C.
See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805,

1809 (2010).
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652C–652E.
See Prosser, supra note 113, at 392 (concluding intrusion upon seclusion protects a
“mental” interest).
See id. at 398 (finding the public disclosure of private facts tort protects “reputation”
interests); see also id. at 400 (positing the false light tort protects “reputation” interests).
See id. at 406 (concluding the tort of appropriation protects “proprietary” interests more
than “mental” interests).
Citron, supra note 112, at 1824 (“Prosser’s privacy taxonomy now permeates case law.”).
For a discussion of the elements comprising the appropriation of name or likeness tort, see
infra Section III.A.1.
See Citron, supra note 112, at 1824–31.
113
114
115

116

117

118

119
120

See id.

121

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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right. 122 Griswold involved a state law that criminalized both the use and
prescription of contraception methods. 123 The Court, by a 7-to-2 vote,
invalidated the law on the grounds that the law unconstitutionally intruded
on the “privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.” 124 Writing for the
majority, Justice Douglas explained that although the Constitution does not
explicitly protect an individual’s privacy, the express protections contained
in the Bill of Rights create “zones of privacy” that are necessary to ensure
the Constitution’s explicit protections. 125 The First Amendment, Justice
Douglas explained, protects privacy in group association; the Third
Amendment in one’s home; the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination
Clause in one’s personal information. 126 Justice Douglas also observed the
protections contained in the Fourth Amendment, suggesting a right to
privacy in one’s person, houses, papers, and effects; 127 and in the Ninth
Amendment, suggesting privacy protections in areas not specifically
addressed in the other amendments. 128

2. Katz and Its Progeny
a. The Reasonable-Expectation-of-Privacy Test
The Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence provides the
most robust probe into the constitutional protections of privacy rights. Two
years after Griswold, the Court decided Katz v. United States, 129 which set
forth the modern test for analyzing the Fourth Amendment’s applicability
to privacy interests. The “reasonable expectation of privacy test,” articulated
in Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion, provides the standard by which
See Arthur E. Brooks, Doe and Dronenburg: Sodomy Statutes Are Constitutional, 26
WM. & MARY L. REV. 645, 662 (1985) (noting Griswold was the “first major privacy
decision.”).
See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480.
Id. at 485–86 (“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”).
Id. at 484 (“[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees
create zones of privacy.” (citation omitted)).
122

123
124

125

126
127

Id.
Id. In pertinent part, the Fourth Amendment provides: “The right of the people to be

secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484. The Ninth Amendment provides: “The enumeration in the
Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
128

129
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courts determine whether a “search” occurred within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 130 Under the test, a search occurs when the government
violates a person’s “reasonable expectation of privacy.” 131 A violation occurs
if: (1) the person had an “actual (subjective) expectation of privacy”; and (2)
the expectation is “one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’” 132 Thus, a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy is
determined by a combination of subjective and objective inquiries.
Since Katz, the Court has routinely applied the reasonableexpectation-of-privacy test to determine the Fourth Amendment’s
applicability to government conduct. On the one hand, the Court has found
a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s home 133 and its curtilage; 134 a
lawfully possessed rental vehicle; 135 the contents of a passenger bag 136 or
suitcase; 137 the results of a diagnostic urine sample; 138 and the contents of
films. 139 On the other hand, the Court has found no reasonable expectation
of privacy in a vehicle in which a person has no ownership or possessory

See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (setting forth a two-prong test for assessing the Fourth
Amendment’s application).
See id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion of the Court, which I read to
hold only . . . that an enclosed telephone booth is an area where, like a home and unlike a
field, a person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy . . . .”
(citations omitted)).
Id. at 361.
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213–14 (1981) (holding the Fourth Amendment
requires a judicial determination of probable cause before police may search a home without
a search warrant); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (stating the zone of privacy
is most clearly defined by the “unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s home”).
Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2013) (“We therefore regard the area ‘immediately
surrounding and associated with the home’—what our cases call the curtilage—as ‘part of the
home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’” (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S.
170, 180 (1984))).
Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518, 1524 (2018) (holding as a general rule a person in
lawful possession of a rental car has a reasonable expectation of privacy even if that person
is not listed on the rental agreement).
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 339 (2000) (holding the Fourth Amendment protects
a traveler’s carry-on bag from unreasonable physical manipulation).
Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979) (holding the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement applies to personal luggage taken from a vehicle).
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (“The reasonable expectation of
privacy enjoyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the
results of those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent.”).
Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 654 (1980) (“[T]he unauthorized exhibition of the
films constituted an unreasonable invasion of their owner's constitutionally protected interest
in privacy.”).
130

131

132
133

134

135

136

137

138
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interest; 140 the numbers dialed from a telephone; 141 open fields; 142 plainly
observable areas of one’s yard, including those observable by aerial
surveillance; 143 and trash left for collection. 144

b. The Third-Party Doctrine
Under the “third-party doctrine,” individuals possess no reasonable
expectation of privacy in information they voluntarily convey to a third party,
“even if the information is revealed on the assumption that it will be used
only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third party will
not be betrayed.” 145 In United States v. Miller, 146 the Court held that a bank
depositor did not maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy in financial
information voluntarily conveyed to a bank in the ordinary course of
business. 147 The Court found that because the depositor assumed the risk
that the bank would reveal his information to the Government, he could not
reasonably expect that information to remain private. 148
The Court reaffirmed its holding in Miller three years later in Smith v.
Maryland, 149 where the Court found a person had no reasonable expectation
of privacy in the phone numbers he dialed because he voluntarily conveyed
those numbers to the phone company by using the phone. Citing Miller,
the Court in Smith found the defendant assumed the risk that the telephone
company would reveal the call-log information to the police. 150 The Court
found that the defendant’s privacy claim fell flat under the objective prong
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148–49 (1978) (holding Petitioners’ claims failed because
they “made no showing that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove
compartment or area under the seat of the car in which they were merely passengers”).
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (stating a person has no legitimate
expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties).
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984) (“[A]n individual may not legitimately
demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately
surrounding the home.”).
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–51 (1989) (holding the Fourth Amendment was not
violated when police view from an aircraft revealed marijuana growing on the defendant’s
property); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (holding the Fourth Amendment
does not require law enforcement traveling in public airways to get a warrant to see what is
visible with the naked eye).
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988) (stating exposing garbage to the public
by placing it on the curb defeats any Fourth Amendment protection).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–46.
Miller, 425 U.S. at 442–43.
140

141

142

143

144

145
146
147
148
149
150

Id.
Id. at 443.
Smith, 442 U.S. at 744–75.
Id.
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of the Katz test because, in part, the public knows the telephone company’s
facilities are capable of tracking and storing the phone numbers a person
dials. 151

3. Fourth Amendment Privacy and Advancements in Technology
In recent years, rapid advancements in technology have challenged the
Fourth Amendment’s precepts. Certain technological advancements
provide new means for collecting and storing information; others make new
types of information available. Accordingly, the Court has been forced to
grapple with privacy concerns implicated in not only the methods of
collection but also the types of information collected. This section briefly
overviews three cases in which the Court was forced to confront these issues.

a. Maryland v. King
In Maryland v. King, 152 the Court held that using a cheek swab to take
and analyze an arrestee’s DNA for identification purposes following a lawful
arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment. 153 While the Court
acknowledged that using a cheek swab to obtain a DNA sample constitutes
a search, 154 the Court found that the circumstances of the case—namely, the
swab was conducted incident to arrest and the sample was used strictly for
identification purposes—rendered the search reasonable. 155 Importantly, the
Court acknowledged that the lawfulness of performing such a search on the
average citizen fell outside the scope of the Court’s opinion “because unlike
the search of a citizen who has not been suspected of a wrong, a detainee
has a reduced expectation of privacy.” 156
The Court paid little attention to the type of information gathered but
instead focused on the method by which the police gathered the DNA
information. 157 The Court observed that the cheek swab at issue “involve[d]
Id. at 742 (“All subscribers realize, moreover, that the phone company has facilities for
making permanent records of the numbers they dial”).
Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013).
See id. at 465–66 (“When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause . . . , taking
and analyzing a cheek swab of the arrestee’s DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing,
a legitimate police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”).
See id. at 446 (“It can be agreed that using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s
cheek in order to obtain DNA samples is a search.”).
See id. at 461–65. The Fourth Amendment only protects against “unreasonable searches
and seizures.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
King, 569 U.S. at 463.
See id. at 463–64 (“[A] buccal swab involves an even more brief and still minimal intrusion.
A gentle rub along the inside of the cheek does not break the skin, and it ‘involves virtually
no risk, trauma, or pain.’”).
151

152
153
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155
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157
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an even more brief and still minimal intrusion” than other approved
incident-to-arrest search procedures. 158 While the Court acknowledged early
in the opinion that DNA samples can reveal significant information about a
person, 159 it found the Maryland statute, which authorized such searches,
provided adequate safeguards against police misuse such that the authorized
procedures did “not amount to a significant invasion of privacy.” 160

b. Birchfield v. North Dakota
Issues of privacy and the Government’s use of technology confronted
the Court again in 2016. Birchfield v. North Dakota 161 asked the Court to
decide whether so-called “implied consent laws” violated the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches. 162 In an effort to
combat drunk driving, states enacted implied consent laws requiring drivers
suspected of drunk driving to submit to blood-alcohol-concentration (BAC)
tests. 163 These laws provide that drivers impliedly consent to BAC testing by
driving on public roads. 164 The laws at issue in Birchfield, however, made it
a crime to refuse to submit to a BAC test after being lawfully arrested for
impaired driving. 165
Birchfield involved three separate cases of individuals from different
states who refused to submit to BAC testing. The disposition of each case
turned on the type of BAC testing at issue: breath test or blood draw. In the
case of Danny Birchfield, Birchfield was criminally prosecuted under North
Dakota law for, and ultimately pleaded guilty to, refusing to submit to a
blood draw following his arrest for driving while impaired. 166 Robert
Bernard, Jr. was criminally prosecuted under Minnesota law for refusing to
158
159
160

Id. at 463–64.
Id. at 442–43.
Id. at 464–65. Specifically, the Court referenced statutory language that barred government

officials from using the DNA samples “‘for information that does not relate to the
identification of individuals.’” Id. at 465 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-512(c)
(LexisNexis 2019)). The Court also noted earlier in the decision that the statute also prohibits
“[t]ests for familial matches.” Id. at 444 (citing MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d)
(LexisNexis 2019)).
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160 (2016).
Id. at 2166–67.

161
162

Id.
See Robert B. Voas et al., Implied-Consent Laws: A Review of the Literature and
Examination of Current Problems and Related Statutes, 40 J. SAFETY RES. 77, 79 (2009)
163
164

(“[I]mplied-consent laws [are] based on the principle that driving is a privilege, not a right,
and in accepting a drivers license, an individual is deemed to have given consent to a chemical
test.” (citation omitted)).
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2170–72.
Id. at 2170–71.

165
166
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submit to a breath test following his arrest for driving under the influence,
but the state trial court dismissed the charge, finding the Fourth
Amendment prohibited the warrantless breath test. 167 Finally, Steve Michael
Beylund’s driver’s license was suspended in an administrative proceeding
after he submitted to a blood test. 168 Beylund’s submission to the blood test
came after a police officer told Beylund that North Dakota law required his
submission. 169 The North Dakota Supreme Court found Beylund
voluntarily consented to the blood draw and therefore affirmed the
suspension. 170
Because the testing in each case occurred after a lawful arrest, the
Court constructed its analytical framework around the “search-incident-toarrest” doctrine, 171 which categorically permits police officers to search,
without a warrant, the person and surrounding area of an arrestee following
a lawful arrest. 172 The justification for the exception to the warrant
requirement is based on officer safety and preservation of evidence. 173 After
canvassing the history of the exception, the Court acknowledged that BAC
testing, while not an entirely “new” phenomenon, was not contemplated in
the Founding era; accordingly, the Court examined the specific BAC testing
methods at issue, balancing the “degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and . . . the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.” 174

i. Breath Test
The Court found binding precedent permitted the breath tests, stating,
“Years ago we said that breath tests do not ‘implicat[e] significant privacy
concerns.’ That remains so today.” 175 Acknowledging the diminished
167
168
169
170
171

Id. at 2171.
Id. at 2171–72.
Id. at 2172.
Id.
Id. at 2174 (“In the three cases now before us, the drivers were searched or told that they

were required to submit to a search after being placed under arrest for drunk driving. We
therefore consider how the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine applies to breath and blood
tests incident to such arrests.”).
See id. at 2179 (“[T]he legality of a search incident to arrest must be judged on the basis
of categorical rules.”).
See id. at 2176 (“The authority to search the person incident to a lawful custodial arrest,
while based upon the need to disarm and to discover evidence, does not depend on what a
court may later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation . . . .” (quoting
United States v. Robinson, 414 U. S. 218, 235 (1973))).
Id. at 2174–76 (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 385 (2014)).
Id. at 2176 (quoting Skinner v. R Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989))
(citation omitted).
172

173

174
175
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expectation of privacy one holds following an arrest, 176 the Court based its
reasoning on three grounds. First, breath tests do not involve significant
physical intrusion. The breath test at issue in Bernard’s case, the Court
explained, lasted for a short time and involved no pain. 177 And while the
breath test required a sample of “deep lung” air, 178 the Court found that
humans have never asserted a “possessory interest in or any emotional
attachment to any of the air in their lungs.” 179
Second, the Court found that breath tests reveal only negligible
information about the test’s subject. Contrasting the information obtained
through breath tests in this case—“the amount of alcohol in the subject’s
breath” 180—with the information obtained through the cheek swab in King—
the subject’s DNA—the Court found that breath tests involve only minimal
revelations about persons subjected to such tests. 181 Importantly, however,
this comparison seemingly reinforces the narrowness of the holding in King:
post-arrest cheek swabs, for identification purposes only, do not run afoul
of the Fourth Amendment. 182
Finally, the Court found that breath tests do not exacerbate the
inherent embarrassment of an arrest. Noting that breath tests are usually
administered in “private,” the Court found blowing into a straw for several
seconds is not inherently embarrassing. 183
Following an assessment of the Government’s interest in public safety,
the Court ultimately concluded that the Fourth Amendment does not

See id. at 2177 (“Moreover, once placed under arrest, the individual’s expectation of
privacy is necessarily diminished.”).
176

177

Id.

Typically, there is more alcohol present in the deeper portions of the lungs (i.e., the
“alveolar sacs”) than in other portions of the lung. See State v. Brayman, 751 P.2d 294, 297
(Wash. 1988). Thus, most breath test machines are designed to test the last portion of a
person’s breath. Id.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2177.
178

179
180
181
182

Id.
Id.
See id. The Court explained:

[Breath tests] contrast sharply with the sample of cells collected by the swab in Maryland v.
King. Although the DNA obtained under the law at issue in that case could lawfully be used
only for identification purposes, the process put into the possession of law enforcement
authorities a sample from which a wealth of additional, highly personal information could
potentially be obtained. A breath test, by contrast, results in a BAC reading on a machine,
nothing more. No sample of anything is left in the possession of the police.
Id. (citation omitted).
183

See id.
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require police to obtain a warrant before conducting a breath test incident
to arrest. 184

ii. Blood Draw
The Court found important distinctions between blood draws and
breath tests that rendered warrantless blood draws unreasonable.
Examining blood-draw procedures, the court found that blood draws
implicate significant privacy interests for two reasons. First, unlike breath
tests, blood draws require a physical intrusion into the subject’s body by
piercing of the skin. 185 Second, and unlike the finding in King, the Court
found the potential for misuse raised grave concerns. 186 Specifically, the
Court found that preserved blood samples can reveal information about a
person beyond the levels of alcohol contained in the subject’s blood. 187 And
even if police were precluded from using the sample for other purposes, the
Court noted, “the potential [for misuse] remains and may result in anxiety
for the person tested.” 188
On balance, the Court found, the privacy interests at stake in blooddraw cases outweigh states’ interests in public safety. 189 Thus, the Court
concluded, a warrantless blood draw performed incident to arrest violates
the Fourth Amendment. 190

c. Carpenter v. United States
The Court’s most recent opportunity to address modern technology’s
implications on Fourth Amendment privacy arose in Carpenter v. United
States. 191 In June 2018, the Court issued its decision in Carpenter, which
held that “an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
record of his physical movements as captured through” cell-site location
information (CSLI). 192 CSLI refers to time-stamped location records
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
191

See id. at 2184.
See id. at 2178.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 2184–85.
See id.
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).

See id. at 2217. While the plain words of the Court’s express holding appeared to establish
significant, broad-sweeping precedential value, see id., the majority seemed to leave room

192

for scaling back some of the decision’s most important protections by peppering its opinion
with qualifying statements. For instance, while the Court’s broad statement suggests that
warrantless government access to an individual’s CSLI constitutes a search, the Court
included a footnote suggesting that its holding was limited to the seven days of CSLI gathered
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generated from a cell phone’s communications with nearby cell towers. 193 As
the Court in Carpenter explained:
Cell phones continuously scan their environment looking for the
best signal, which generally comes from the closest cell site. Most
modern devices, such as smartphones, tap into the wireless
network several times a minute whenever their signal is on, even
if the owner is not using one of the phone’s features. Each time
the phone connects to a cell site, it generates time-stamped
records known as [CSLI]. 194
The petitioner in Carpenter—Timothy Carpenter—was arrested and
convicted on five firearm counts in connection with a series of robberies
after a suspect identified Carpenter as an accomplice. 195 Based on the
information provided by the suspect, prosecutors applied for court orders
under the Stored Communications Act 196 to compel Carpenter’s wireless
carriers to disclose CSLI linked to Carpenter’s phone during the fourmonth period in which the robberies occurred. 197 After obtaining the orders,
prosecutors obtained CSLI records from Carpenter’s wireless carriers
covering one-hundred and twenty-seven days of Carpenter’s location
information and disclosing nearly 13,000 location points cataloging
by police in that case. See id. at 2217 n.3 (“It is sufficient for our purposes today to hold that
accessing seven days of CSLI constitutes a Fourth Amendment search.”). In fact, despite the
sweeping language of the Court’s holding, the Court later described its decision as “a narrow
one” and limited its application to historical—as opposed to real-time—CSLI. See id. at 2220.
See Cell Site Location Information, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., (Mar. 28, 2019),
https://bit.ly/2B89YZi [https://perma.cc/SCZ2-34QV]. CSLI is the information that cell
phones convey to nearby cell towers. Id. Cell phones constantly search for nearby cell towers
in order to locate the tower providing the strongest signal. Id. The tower with the strongest
signal provides the cell phone with the fastest service. Id. When the cell phone connects to
a tower, the person’s wireless provider records the time and duration of the connection. Id.
Wireless providers store two types of CSLI: historical and prospective. Id. Historical CSLI
is used to track a person’s past movements. Id. Prospective CSLI allows for tracking in real
time. Id. The Court in Carpenter addressed the use of historical CSLI and expressly refused
to address the propriety of prospective CSLI. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“We do
not express a view on matters not before us: real-time CSLI or ‘tower dumps’ . . . .”).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211.
Id. at 2212–13.
Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2018). The Stored
Communications Act (SCA) permits the Government “to compel the disclosure of certain
telecommunications records when it ‘offers specific and articulable facts showing that there
are reasonable grounds to believe’ that the records sought ‘are relevant and material to an
ongoing criminal investigation.’” Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d)).
Thus, in order to obtain an order to compel those records under the SCA, the Government
need not satisfy the same requirements for obtaining a warrant—specifically, the requirement
of probable cause.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
193

194
195
196
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Carpenter’s movements. 198 Carpenter moved to suppress the CSLI prior to
trial, but the district court denied his motion. 199
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court’s ruling, holding Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his location information. 200 The Sixth Circuit found the third-party
doctrine rendered Carpenter’s expectation of privacy in his movements
unreasonable because Carpenter had voluntarily conveyed his location
information to his wireless carriers in the ordinary course of business. 201
Citing Smith v. Maryland, 202 the Sixth Circuit concluded that Carpenter’s
CSLI constituted voluntarily disclosed business records not entitled to
Fourth Amendment protection. 203
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Carpenter opened with an
observation of the pervasiveness of cell phones in modern America and the
near-constant stream of data sent to wireless carriers, “even if the owner is
not using one of the phone’s features.” 204 The Court noted that “[w]ireless
carriers collect and store CSLI” primarily for business purposes, but the
Court also acknowledged “wireless carriers often sell aggregated location
records to data brokers, without individual identifying information of the
sort at issue here.” 205 Recent advancements in technology, the Court
observed, have made it possible for “modern cell phones [to] generate
increasingly vast amounts of increasingly precise CSLI.” 206
After surveying the Fourth Amendment’s history and its guiding
principles, 207 the Court found the expectation of privacy in one’s CSLI lies
“at the intersection of two lines of cases”: (1) those addressing the
expectation of privacy in one’s physical location and movements; and (2)

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2213.
Id. For a discussion of the third-party doctrine, see supra Section II.B.2.b.
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). For a brief discussion of Smith v. Maryland,
which reaffirmed the third-party doctrine’s general precepts, see supra Section II.B.2.b.
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
Id. at 2211.
Id. at 2212 (emphasis added).
Id.
198
199
200
201
202

203
204
205
206
207

In particular, the Court acknowledged two “basic guideposts” that applied to the case in

Carpenter. First, the Court noted, the Fourth Amendment “seeks to secure ‘the privacies of
life’ against ‘arbitrary power.’” Id. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886)). The Court then noted that “a central aim of the Framers was ‘to place obstacles in
the way of a too permeating police surveillance.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Di Re, 332
U.S. 581, 595 (1948)). For further implications of the Court’s survey of the Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, see infra Section II.B.3.d.
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those in which the Court applied the third-party doctrine. 208 Ultimately, these
two lines of cases formed the path to the Court’s holding in Carpenter.

i. Distinctions from Public Movement Cases
The CSLI technology in Carpenter presented the Court with unique
circumstances that fit somewhere between the two poles of the first line of
cases. On the one hand, the Court explained, the Court previously held that
people do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their travels on
public roads, even when law enforcement uses “augmented” visual
surveillance. 209 In United States v. Knotts, 210 the Court held that a search did
not occur when police planted a beeper in a container carried on the
defendant’s vehicle and used the beeper’s signal to track the defendant to
his final destination. 211 The Court in Knotts focused not on the use of the
monitoring technology but rather on the defendant’s use of public roads. 212
The Court in Knotts found that the use of technology to augment the
“sensory faculties bestowed upon [officers] at birth” does not constitute a
search when the police could have otherwise lawfully monitored the
suspect’s movements without the technology. 213
On the other hand, the Court in Carpenter noted, the Court has also
held that planting a GPS tracking device on the undercarriage of a person’s
vehicle and using the GPS to conduct surveillance constitutes a search. 214 In
United States v. Jones, 215 the Court found that such use of technology
constitutes a search, but it did not reach this conclusion based on the
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Instead, the Court in Jones
found that a search occurred because the police had physically trespassed
onto the person’s property when they placed the device on the vehicle’s
undercarriage. 216 Because the police carried out the trespass for the purpose
of monitoring the defendant’s movements, a search had occurred. 217

208
209

See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2214–15.
Id. at 2215 (citing United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280–81 (1983)).

210

United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).

211

See id. at 282–85.
See id. at 282 (“Visual surveillance from public places . . . would have sufficed to reveal all

212

[relevant] facts to the police. The fact that the officers in this case relied not only on visual
surveillance, but also on the use of the beeper . . . does not alter the situation.”).
213
214

Id.
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2215 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05

(2012)).
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
Id. at 404–05.
215
216
217

Id.
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The Court in Carpenter ultimately noted that, much like the GPS
monitoring in Jones, CSLI is “detailed, encyclopedic, and effortlessly
compiled.” 218 But the Carpenter Court found that CSLI produced far more
information about the subject of the search than the GPS monitoring in
Jones. Focusing heavily on the technology’s ability to “achieve near perfect
surveillance,” the Court observed two interconnected aspects of the
technology: (1) its precision; and (2) the breadth of information it can reveal
about a person. 219 The Court noted that cell phones have become “almost a
‘feature of human anatomy,’” tracking “nearly exactly the movements of its
owners.” 220 Unlike the beeper in Knotts or the GPS in Jones, the Court
explained, cell phones follow their owners beyond public roads and into
areas of life that historically have been deemed private, such as homes,
doctors’ offices, and political headquarters. 221 The Court further noted that
CSLI’s precision has rapidly improved in recent years, now enabling
wireless carriers to identify users’ locations with increasing accuracy. 222
Importantly, the Court expressed significant concern regarding future
advancements in CSLI technology and how those advancements could lead
to increasingly more accurate surveillance. 223
With respect to the breadth of the information, the Court noted that
CSLI’s ability to calculate a phone’s location implicates privacy concerns
that strike at the core of the Fourth Amendment’s protections. 224 The places
that a person visits, the Court explained, can reveal significant details about
that person, including “not only [a person’s] particular movements, but
through them [his or her] ‘familial, political, professional, religious, and
sexual associations.’” 225 These associations, the Court noted, have been
218
219
220
221
222

Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216.
Id. at 2217–18.
Id. at 2218.
Id.
Id. at 2218–19 (“[T]he rule the Court adopts ‘must take account of more sophisticated

systems that are already in use or in development.’” (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 36 (2001))).
See id. at 2219. Specifically, the Court noted:
While the records in this case reflect the state of technology at the start of the decade, the
accuracy of CSLI is rapidly approaching GPS-level precision. As the number of cell sites has
proliferated, the geographic area covered by each cell sector has shrunk, particularly in urban
areas. In addition, with new technology measuring the time and angle of signals hitting their
towers, wireless carriers already have the capability to pinpoint a phone’s location within 50
meters.
223

Id.
See id. at 2217–18 (“Mapping a cell phone’s location over the course of 127 days provides
an all-encompassing record of the holder’s whereabouts.” (emphasis added)).
Id. at 2217.
224

225
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characterized as the “privacies of life.” 226 And because cell phones travel with
a person nearly everywhere he or she goes, while generating increasingly
more accurate information, CSLI data provides an “intimate window into a
person’s life” that directly implicates the expectations of privacy, which the
drafters of the Fourth Amendment sought to protect. 227

ii. Carpenter’s Application of the Third-Party Doctrine
The third-party doctrine’s application to the CSLI in Carpenter
presented somewhat of a square peg/round hole dilemma. 228 The
Government in Carpenter argued that even though a person might have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his or her movements when surveilled
by GPS monitoring, CSLI data falls within the ambit of the third-party
doctrine because the data amounted to business records obtained by
wireless carriers. 229 While Justice Kennedy agreed with the Government’s
position, 230 the majority did not.
At face value, the third-party doctrine, as it existed pre-Carpenter,
arguably encompassed CSLI: third-party businesses collected the data;
Carpenter knowingly shared the data with those third parties; and Carpenter
arguably shared the data voluntarily pursuant to the wireless carriers’ termsof-service agreements. 231 For the majority, however, that position “fail[ed] to
contend with the seismic shifts in digital technology that made possible the
tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also everyone else’s, not for a
short period of time but for years and years.” 232
In what some have deemed a “carve out” to the third-party doctrine, 233
the Court found that the CSLI data in Carpenter, unlike the bank records
226
227
228

Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014)).
Id. at 2217–19.
See Jordan M. Blanke, Carpenter v. United States Begs for Action, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV.

260, 260 (2018).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
See id. at 2226–30 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979) (“This Court consistently has held
that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over
to third parties.”) (discussing the third-party doctrine).
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219.
See Trevor Burrus & James Knight, Katz Nipped and Katz Cradled: Carpenter and the
Evolving Fourth Amendment, 17 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 79, 87 (2018) (“[I]nstead of
reassessing the Court’s entire Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to judge whether this
deviation is justified, [Chief Justice] Roberts carved out a special ‘cell phone exception.’”);
Daniel Solove, Carpenter v. United States, Cell Phone Location Records, and the Third
Party Doctrine, TEACHPRIVACY: PRIVACY + SECURITY BLOG (July 1, 2018),
https://bit.ly/37AzFR2 [https://perma.cc/J7QA-BUMN] (“The Supreme Court should have
overruled the Third Party Doctrine or at least carved out a greater chunk of it.”).
229
230
231

232
233
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in Miller 234 or the phone records in Smith, 235 presented unique concerns that
triggered the Fourth Amendment’s protections. 236 First, the Court noted that
the sheer scope of information collected through CSLI implicates concerns
not previously addressed by the Court’s third-party-doctrine cases. 237 The
aggregated CSLI data acquired by police in Carpenter provided an
“exhaustive chronicle” of Carpenter’s location information. 238 Moreover, the
Court noted, the information collected in previous third-party-doctrine
cases had inherent limitations. 239 For instance, the telephone call logs in
Smith “reveal[ed] little in the way of ‘identifying information,’” and the bank
deposits in Miller were “‘not confidential communications but negotiable
instruments to be used in commercial transactions.’” 240 In both cases, the
Carpenter Court explained, the information obtained from third parties did
not implicate highly sensitive information about who a person is. 241 CSLI
data, on the other hand, provides a “detailed chronicle of a person’s physical
presence compiled every day, every moment, over several years.” 242
The Court also found that cell phone users do not “voluntarily” expose
their CSLI to wireless carriers, as would be required for the third-party
doctrine to apply. 243 In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted two
important aspects of the technology at issue. First, the Court noted again
that cell phones have become such a pervasive force in modern life that
carrying one is now a near-necessity. 244 Second, the Court noted that cell
phones share their users’ location information without any affirmative act
on the part of the user. 245 Users begin sharing their location information with
wireless companies from the moment they turn on their phones. 246 For the

See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979). For further discussion of the third-party
doctrine, including its application in Miller and Smith, see supra Section II.B.2.b.
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20.
Id. at 2219.
Id.
See id. at 2219–20.
Id. at 2219.
See id. at 2219–20.
Id. at 2220.
See id.
Id. (“[C]ell phones and the services they provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part of

234
235

236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244

daily life’ that carrying one is indispensable to participation in modern society.” (quoting
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 383 (2014))).
Id. (“[A] cell phone logs a cell-sit record by dint of its operation, without any affirmative
act on the part of the user beyond powering up.”).
245

246

Id.
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Court, this dynamic rendered the sharing of CSLI an involuntary act. 247
Based on these key distinctions, the Court declared its unwillingness to
extend the third-party doctrine to this “distinct category of information.” 248

d. Fourth Amendment Privacy and Advancements in Technology
Redux
As the forgoing Fourth Amendment cases demonstrate, privacy
interests extend beyond the common law and technology has created
serious implications for historic notions of privacy. But the value of those
cases is limited to the context in which they arose—namely, Fourth
Amendment challenges. Accordingly, the question facing the Court was not
necessarily whether an invasion of privacy occurred but rather whether the
government intruded on a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy and,
if so, whether the intrusion was unreasonable.
While the Court in King held that Maryland’s cheek swab practices
did not violate the Fourth Amendment, it did not find that individuals
possess no privacy interests in their DNA. 249 In fact, by deeming the cheek
swab a “search” under the Fourth Amendment, the Court necessarily
concluded that the Government’s use of a cheek swab intrudes upon a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. 250 Similarly, while the court in
Birchfield found that “breath tests do not ‘implicat[e] significant privacy
concerns,’” 251 it did not find that breath-test procedures do not implicate
privacy interests at all. 252
Id. (“Apart from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is no way to avoid
leaving behind a trail of location data. As a result, in no meaningful sense does the user
voluntarily ‘assume the risk’ of turning over a comprehensive dossier of his physical
movements.” (brackets omitted) (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979))).

247

248
249

Id.
See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 461–66 (2013) (finding while a person maintains a

privacy interest in his or her DNA, an incident-to-arrest DNA swab does not unreasonably
intrude on that interest).
See id. at 446 (“It can be agreed that using a buccal swab on the inner tissues of a person’s
cheek in order to obtain DNA samples is a search.”).
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176 (2016) (quoting Skinner v. Ry. Labor
Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 626 (1989)) (emphasis added).
See id. at 2184. Notably, the Court’s analysis of the breath test assumed that a search had
in fact occurred since the question presented was whether a breath test administered incident
to arrest was reasonable. See id. at 2174 (“In the three cases now before us, the drivers were
searched or told that they were required to submit to a search after being placed under arrest
250

251

252
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A deeper look into the holdings in King and Birchfield suggests that
the Court’s treatment of privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment
turns not only on the extent to which the Government physically intrudes
on an individual’s person but also on (1) the type of information obtained
and limitations thereon as well as (2) the scope of information available. The
apparent narrowness of the Court’s holding in King 253 resulted from the
limitations that Maryland imposed on police officers’ use of the
information—specifically, the officers were limited to using the DNA for
identification purposes only. 254 Presumably, then, the Court in Birchfield
could have found blood draws for the limited purpose of measuring a
person’s BAC proper. Admittedly, the Court’s refusal to establish such a
rule could have resulted from the physically intrusive nature of blood draw
procedures. 255 But the Court’s analysis in Birchfield did not stop at the
physical intrusion. Instead, the Court went on to state:
[A] blood test, unlike a breath test, places in the hands of law
enforcement authorities a sample that can be preserved and from
which it is possible to extract information beyond a simple BAC
reading. Even if the law enforcement agency is precluded from

testing the blood for any purpose other than to measure BAC,
the potential remains and may result in anxiety for the person
tested.
256

The Court’s statement suggests two concerns. First, by invoking the
potential for misuse, the Court seemingly factors into its analysis the
information attainable through a blood sample. A blood sample can reveal
significantly more information about a person than a cheek swab. 257 By
removing from police the ability to obtain such information, the Court’s
decision suggests a distrust of government maintenance of such broadly
applicable information absent in King.

for drunk driving. We therefore consider how the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine applies
to breath and blood tests incident to such arrests.”).
See supra Section II.B.3.a (discussing the holding in King).
See King, 569 U.S. at 465–66.
See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178 (“Blood tests are a different matter. They ‘require
piercing the skin’ and extract a part of the subject’s body. And while humans exhale air from
their lungs many times per minute, humans do not continually shed blood.” (quoting
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625) (citations omitted)).
Id. (emphasis added).
Compare Saliva Samples Can Reveal Serious Illnesses, SCI. DAILY (July 29, 2013),
https://bit.ly/2SEru2t [https://perma.cc/RGW8-GYSR] (noting limitations on disease
detection using saliva samples), with Tim Jewell, All About Blood Tests, HEALTHLINE (Feb.
19, 2019), https://bit.ly/37hq4gH [https://perma.cc/MGB8-9UGD] (describing the vast
information about a person that can be obtained through blood samples).
253
254
255

256
257
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Second, the Court seemingly placed some weight on the mental harm
that blood draws can cause. 258 That harm, however, was not the physical
harm caused by administering the blood draw itself. Rather, the Court
focused on the potential mental harm caused by the lingering prospect of
the Government misusing such a broad array of personal information. 259
Similar concerns manifested in Carpenter. The Court in Carpenter
bookended its analysis with some “basic guideposts” for assessing Fourth
Amendment challenges to the Government’s use of technology. 260 First, the
Court noted, “the Fourth Amendment seeks to secure ‘the privacies of life’
against ‘arbitrary power.’” 261 At the heart of this concept is the fundamental
concern that the Government, equipped with the full power of the State,
will use its authority to pry into the private lives of citizens. 262 This concern
emerges from the power imbalance that exists between the Government and
the people. Without constitutional safeguards in place, the Government
could use its power to intrude into peoples’ private affairs without facing any
meaningful barriers.
But the Court’s concerns do not end there. The second guidepost, the
Court noted, is “a central aim of the Framers [] ‘to place obstacles in the
way of a too permeating police surveillance.’” 263 Assessed against the
backdrop of the Court’s more recent Fourth Amendment technology
cases, 264 the Court’s concerns suggest a deeper distrust of the Government’s
use of power to collect and use information that appears harmless—namely,
a person’s locations over an extended period of time—but that reveals highly
private, intimate details about peoples’ lives. The majority in Carpenter
understood that CSLI reveals much more than a person’s location: it reveals
information about who the person is through his or her “‘familial, political,
professional, religious, and sexual associations.’” 265
A person’s movements and locations over an extended period of time
can paint a detailed portrait of that person by revealing the person’s work
See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2178 (“Even if the law enforcement agency is precluded from
testing the blood for any purpose other than to measure BAC, the potential remains and
may result in anxiety for the person tested.”).

258

259
260
261
262

See id.
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213–16 (2018).
See id. at 2214 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
See id. (“As technology has enhanced the Government’s capacity to encroach upon areas

normally guarded from inquisitive eyes, this Court has sought to ‘assure preservation of that
degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was
adopted.’” (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001))).
Id. at 2214.
See supra Sections II.B.3.a–c.
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415
(2012)).

263
264
265
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and home addresses; the places that he or she does and does not visit; the
businesses at which he or she shops; his or her place of worship; and
whether the person visits the locations of political protests. And through
CSLI, all of this information is conveniently timestamped to reveal the
precise time at which the person arrived at a location, as well as the duration
of time that elapsed before the person traveled to his or her next destination.
Together, this information can reveal much about who the person is,
including the people with whom he or she frequently, or infrequently,
associates; the organizations in which he or she participates; and his or her
spending preferences, religious affiliations, and level of political
involvement. Carpenter thus represents more than the Court’s
unwillingness to permit the Government to obtain information about a
person’s location, but instead stands for the proposition that the information
about a person that one can learn through extended surveillance of his or
her movements paints a far-too-detailed portrait of that person’s life.
Accordingly, people can reasonably expect to retain privacy in those
details—regardless of the methods used to circumvent their expectations.
It is against this backdrop that Part III assesses the privacy rights
implicated when private actors obtain an individual’s biometric information.
IV. CURRENT PRIVACY CLAIMS AND BIOMETRIC PRIVACY

A. Privacy in Tort
Over the course of several decades, the American right to privacy took
shape in the civil context through four now-commonly recognized privacy
torts. 266 Privacy torts generally aim to protect individuals from “mental pain
and distress” arising from privacy invasions 267 and seek to remedy emotional,
reputational, and proprietary injuries. 268 This section first overviews the
privacy tort most relevant to facial recognition technology—appropriation of
name or likeness—and assesses the viability of appropriation claims that are
based on privacy injuries caused by facial recognition technology in the
social-media context. It concludes that such claims would likely fail. Next,
this section uses O’Neill’s 10-Year Challenge theory to demonstrate how
even appropriation-by-manipulation claims would also likely fail.

266
267

See supra notes 106–20 and accompanying text.
See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 98, at 196 (“[M]odern enterprise and invention have,

through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental pain and distress, far greater
than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury.”).
See supra notes 106–20 and accompanying text.
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1. Appropriation and Facebook’s Facial Recognition Techniques
The appropriation tort protects an individual’s “exclusive use of his
own identity, in so far as it is represented by his name or likeness, and in so
far as the use may be of benefit to him or to others.” 269 Under the definition
of appropriation provided by the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
many states have adopted, an appropriation occurs when a person
appropriates “the name or likeness of another” for his or her “own use or
benefit.” 270

a. Name or Likeness
Most courts have found that the phrase “name or likeness” extends
beyond a person’s actual name or likeness to broader aspects of the person’s
identity. 271 Accordingly, courts have held that “name or likeness” includes,
among other things, nicknames, 272 professions, 273 identifying characteristics, 274
and catch phrases, 275 provided that those aspects are reasonably tied to the
injured party’s identity. On the other hand, “name or likeness” does not
encompass matters generally removed from the person’s identity, such as a
passing reference to a person. 276

269

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1977).

270

Id. § 652C.
See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 218–19; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

271

OF TORTS § 652C cmt. c (“The interest protected by the rule stated in this Section is the
interest of the individual in the exclusive use of his own identity, in so far as it is represented
by his name or likeness, and in so far as the use may be of benefit to him or to others.”).
See Hirsch v. S. C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 137 (Wis. 1979) (finding the
use of a famous football player’s nickname fell within the ambit of the appropriation tort)
(“The fact that the name, ‘Crazylegs,’ used by [defendant], was a nickname rather than
[plaintiff’s] actual name does not preclude a cause of action. All that is required is that the
name clearly identify the wronged person.” (emphasis added)).
See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, 726–29 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (finding a magazine’s
depiction of a person with facial features similar to a famous boxer sitting near a boxing ring
implicated the appropriation tort).
See Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 827 (9th Cir. 1974)
(finding a photograph that depicted a race car bearing similar, distinct characteristics of a
famous race car driver constituted appropriation of the driver’s name or likeness).
See Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 836 (6th Cir. 1983)
(finding the use of a well-known television host’s catch phrase constituted appropriation of
the host’s name or likeness).
See Stien v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, 944 P.2d 374, 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (finding
plaintiff failed to establish that the producers of a video in which her husband was featured
making passing references to her did not constitute an appropriation of her name or
likeness).
272

273

274

275

276
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Facebook appropriates its users’ name or likeness by capturing and
storing their facial biometrics. By definition, facial biometrics are inherent
to a person’s identity. 277 As the ACLU explained in a recent amicus brief,
facial scans target the very essence of peoples’ identities because “each [face]
is unique, and cannot be altered.” 278 Similarly, the Illinois legislature found
that biometric information is “biologically unique to the individual.” 279

b. Commercial or Other Value
To prevail on an appropriation claim, plaintiffs in some states are
required to show that the appropriated identity possesses some inherent
value that the defendant exploited. 280 In establishing these requirements,
courts have relied on the language of the Restatement’s commentary, which
limits the actionable conduct to a defendant’s appropriation of the
“reputation, prestige, social or commercial standing, public interest or other
values of the plaintiff’s name or likeness.” 281 Some courts that impose these
requirements have found it necessary for plaintiffs to prove that they possess
some “notoriety or skill,” 282 and others have required plaintiffs to show that
their name or likeness carries some “market value” or “economic worth.” 283
Other courts, however, have found a showing of commercial value
unnecessary. For example, in Fraley v. Facebook, 284 the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California found California’s appropriation
statute requires no showing of a “preexisting value, and in fact can be read
to presume that a person whose name, photograph, or likeness is used by
another for commercial purposes without their consent is ‘injured as a result
thereof.’” 285

See Putting More than Just a Name to a Face, NEC, https://bit.ly/2BRkpkF
[https://perma.cc/L5M3-V5RC] (“The human face plays an important role in our social
interaction, conveying people’s identity.”); Facial Recognition, supra note 17 (“Like all
biometrics solutions, face recognition technology measures and matches the unique
characteristics for the purposes of identification or authentication.”).
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees
Seeking Affirmance at 13, Patel v. Facebook, 932 F.3d 1264, 1270–75 (9th Cir. 2019),
https://bit.ly/2V3stG8 [https://perma.cc/JJV4-LTHK].
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/5(g) (LexisNexis 2019).
See, e.g., Meadows v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., 492 F.3d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 2007); Lawrence
v. A.S. Abell Co., 475 A.2d 448, 453 (Md. 1984).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
See Meadows, 492 F.3d at 638.
See Lawrence, 475 A.2d at 453.
Fraley v. Facebook, Inc., 830 F. Supp. 2d 785 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
Id. at 806 (assessing the injury element under California’s misappropriation statute).
277

278

279
280

281
282
283
284
285
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Perhaps the schism stems from a misunderstanding of the distinction
between the appropriation tort and the right of publicity tort. As the
Supreme Court of Nevada noted in People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd. 286:
The common law appropriation tort ordinarily involves the
unwanted and unpermitted use of the name or likeness of an
ordinary, uncelebrated person for advertising or other such
commercial purposes, although it is possible that the
appropriation tort might arise from the misuse of another’s name
for purposes not involving strictly monetary gain. The right of
publicity tort, on the other hand, involves the appropriation of a
celebrity’s name or identity for commercial purposes. The
distinction between these two torts is the interest each seeks to
protect. The appropriation tort seeks to protect an individual’s
personal interest in privacy; the personal injury is measured in
terms of the mental anguish that results from the appropriation
of an ordinary individual’s identity. The right to publicity seeks to
protect the property interest that a celebrity has in his or her
name; the injury is not to personal privacy, it is the economic loss
a celebrity suffers when someone else interferes with the property
interest that he or she has in his or her name. 287
Absent a change in the ways in which state courts approach the
appropriation tort, however, Facebook would likely avoid liability in the
majority of appropriation cases. Under the commercial-value approach, a
person must maintain celebrity status to mount a successful appropriation
claim, 288 leaving appropriation claims open to only a small portion of users. 289
PETA v. Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 895 P.2d 1269 (Nev. 1995).
Id. at 1283 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Hirsch v. S. C. Johnson & Son,
Inc., 280 N.W.2d 129, 132 (Wis. 1979) (“We conclude that the right of a person to be
compensated for the use of his name for advertising purposes or purposes of trade is distinct
from other privacy torts which protect primarily the mental interest in being let alone.”).
See Note, In the Face of Danger: Facial Recognition and the Limits of Privacy Law, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1870, 1880 (2007) (“[T]he only ones who can invoke [the misappropriation
tort] are those whose names and faces are well recognized, and who therefore have
commercial value that could be exploited—in short, celebrities.” (footnote omitted)).
As of December 2018, there were over 2.32 billion Facebook users worldwide who used
Facebook regularly each month. See Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Reports Fourth
Quarter and Full Year 2018 Results (Jan. 30, 2019), https://bit.ly/2GBlMaW
[https://perma.cc/V2V3-98HL]. Some estimates indicate that between approximately 1 in
10,000 and 5 in 10,000 people worldwide are famous. See Samuel Arbesman, The Fraction
of Famous People in the World, WIRED (Jan. 22, 2013), https://bit.ly/2nXPI5s
[https://perma.cc/P7BD-TXRB]. The role of social-media “influencers” (i.e., users who have
acquired a relatively large social-media following) might complicate these numbers, as
influencers often receive payment through paid advertising and have therefore likely attained
286
287
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c. Use or Benefit
Problems again arise when assessing whether Facebook gathers and
stores its users’ biometric data for its own “use or benefit.” While the
Restatement’s approach encompasses instances where a person
appropriates another’s name or likeness for any purpose or benefit—“even
though the use is not a commercial one, and even though the benefit sought
to be obtained is not a pecuniary one” 290—some states limit liability to the
appropriator’s commercial use. 291
For its part, Facebook claims to collect and use biometric data strictly
to benefit users. 292 And while some have observed that Facebook also uses
the data to support its research into artificial intelligence technology, 293 the
link between that use and any potential pecuniary gain Facebook derives
from the research may be too attenuated to satisfy the “use or benefit”
element. Absent implementing a practice of selling its users’ biometric data
to third parties, Facebook’s current biometric-data practices fall short of
“commercial use.”

d. Consent
Perhaps the largest barrier to establishing liability is consent. While the
concept of consent does not explicitly appear in the Restatement’s definition
of appropriation, 294 the absence of consent is a widely accepted requirement
for appropriation claims. Some scholars have posited that lack of consent is
an element implied in the definition of “appropriate”; 295 others view consent

celebrity status for purposes of the appropriation tort. Accord Mona Hellenkemper, State of
the Industry—Influencer Marketing in 2019, INFLUENCERDB (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://bit.ly/35uvJ2l [https://perma.cc/2592-8LWS] (“Instagram today has more than 1.4
million accounts with more than 15k followers.”).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
See id. (“Statutes in some states have, however, limited the liability to commercial uses of
the name or likeness.”); see also Lee v. Picture People, Inc., No. K10C-07-002 (RBY), 2012
Del. Super. LEXIS 159, at *6 (Mar. 19, 2012) (“Appropriation claims seek redress for the
‘appropriation of some element of a person's personality for commercial use . . . .’” (quoting
Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709 (Del. Super. Ct. 1967))).
See Facebook Face Recognition, supra note 35 (explaining how Facebook’s use of facial
recognition technology is limited to creating a user-friendly experience); Sherman, supra note
19 (same).
See Bennett, supra note 20.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
See Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture: A Privacy Tort
Response to Consumer Data Profiling, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 128 (2003). Merriam-Webster
Dictionary defines “appropriate,” in part, as: “to take or make use of without authority or
290
291

292

293
294
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as an affirmative defense. 296 Indeed, some states have expressly incorporated
“lack of consent” into the elements of an appropriation claim. 297
According to Prosser, 298 consent serves as an affirmative defense to
appropriation claims and “may be given expressly, or by conduct, such as
posing for a picture with knowledge of the purposes for which it is to be
used.” 299 Thus, courts have held, consent can occur when a person
voluntarily acts after the purported tortfeasor discloses to the person how it
will use the surrendered information. 300
In the online context, a company’s privacy policy or terms of service
may establish the basis for consent. For example, courts have found that
consent exists when a person uses a company’s website and the company
maintains a privacy policy that clearly (1) states the company’s intent to
receive users’ information; (2) explains how the company will use that
information; and (3) makes acceptance of the terms a precondition to using
the website. 301 These types of agreements are known as “browsewrap”
agreements. 302 When a company uses a browsewrap agreement, consent is
valid even if the user did not read the privacy policy, “provided that the user

right.” Appropriate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://bit.ly/2T4SGXp [https://perma.cc/8D859PL8].
See Prosser, supra note 113, at 419 (“Chief among the available defenses is that of the
plaintiff's consent to the invasion, which will bar his recovery as in the case of any other tort.”).
See, e.g., Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
See supra notes 106–20 and accompanying text.
Prosser, supra note 113, at 419.
See In re Google, Inc. Privacy Policy Litig., No. C-12-01382-PSG, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
171124, at *39–42 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2013) (finding plaintiffs failed to state a
misappropriation claim because plaintiffs consented to using Google’s “+1” feature by
voluntarily clicking on the “+1” feature after Google clearly disclosed how the feature
worked).
See Garcia v. Enter. Holdings, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 3d 1125, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 2015). These
types of contracts are known as “browsewrap agreements.” See id.
Contracts formed on the Internet come primarily in two flavors: ‘clickwrap’ (or ‘clickthrough’) agreements, in which website users are required to click on an ‘I agree’ box after
being presented with a list of terms and conditions of use; and ‘browsewrap’ agreements,
where a website’s terms and conditions of use are generally posted on the website via a
hyperlink at the bottom of the screen.
Id. (quoting Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175–76 (9th Cir. 2014)).
In the context of “clickwrap” agreements, however, a user may successfully demonstrate lack
of consent by producing evidence showing he or she did not click the “I agree” box because
assent to the agreement arises when the user clicks on the box. See Garcia, 78 F. Supp. 3d
at 1137. On the other hand, assent to “browsewrap” agreements arises when the user simply
uses the website. Id.
See supra note 301.
296

297
298
299
300
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had actual knowledge of the agreement or the website put ‘a reasonably
prudent user on notice of the terms of the contract.’” 303
Facebook uses a browsewrap agreement, 304 which makes acceptance of
Facebook’s data policy a precondition to using the platform. 305 Thus, by
using Facebook, users consent to the data policy, which clearly states that
Facebook uses facial recognition technology if users “have it turned on.” 306
Accordingly, users are precluded from claiming misappropriation of their
biometric data to the extent Facebook discloses how it uses their data. 307
Facebook provides several examples of how it currently uses facialrecognition technology, which include assisting with “tagging” photos,
detecting impersonation, and assisting users with visual impairments. 308
Thus, absent evidence showing Facebook uses its facial recognition
technology for an undisclosed purpose, 309 Facebook’s use of biometric data
will not give rise to civil liability because consent will always stand in the way.
303
304
305

Garcia, 78 F. Supp. 3d at 1137 (quoting Nguyen, 763 F.3d at 1177).
See Terms of Service, supra note 24.
See id. (“To provide these services, we must collect and use your personal data. We detail

our practices in the Data Policy, which you must agree to in order to use our Products.”).
See Data Policy, supra note 24 (“If you have it turned on, we use face recognition
technology to recognize you in photos, videos and camera experiences.”). In the past,
Facebook’s facial recognition technology was “turned on” by default. Sidney Fussell,
Facebook's New Face Recognition Features: What We Do (and Don't) Know, GIZMODO
(Feb. 27, 2018), https://bit.ly/2CXtplY [https://perma.cc/87MP-2PPQ]. However, Facebook
recently announced a new face recognition feature that is turned off by default. Id.
If, however, Facebook used a consumer’s data in a manner in which it failed to disclose, a
plaintiff may plausibly argue that he or she did not consent. See Cohen v. Facebook, Inc.,
798 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1095–96 (N.D. Cal. 2011). The plaintiffs in Cohen v. Facebook
claimed Facebook misappropriated their names or likenesses when Facebook used their
profile pictures to promote its “Friend Finder” service. See id. at 1094. Pointing to broad,
sweeping statements in its Terms of Service, Facebook argued that the plaintiffs consented
to such use. See id. at 1094–96. The court rejected Facebook’s argument, finding instead
that “[n]othing in the provisions of the Terms documents to which Facebook has pointed
constitutes a clear consent by users to have their name or profile picture shared in a manner
that discloses what services on Facebook they have utilized, or to endorse those services.”
Id. at 1095.
See Facebook Face Recognition, supra note 35.
Such a situation, however, does not fall outside the realm of possibility, given Facebook’s
historical handling of users’ private information. In 2012, Facebook entered into a consent
decree with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) after the FTC found Facebook was
deceiving its users. See Agreement Containing Consent Order, In re Facebook, Inc., No.
092-3184 (F.T.C. Aug. 10, 2012). The FTC’s complaint alleged, among other things, that
Facebook told users that third-party apps could access users’ personal information only to
the extent necessary to operate. See Complaint at 10, In re Facebook, Inc., No. 092-3184
(F.T.C.). In reality, the FTC alleged, Facebook permitted third-party apps to access users’
information that was unrelated to the apps’ operations. Id.
306

307

308
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2. Appropriation by Manipulation
Even appropriation of biometric data by manipulation falls outside the
purview of privacy-tort claims. Consider the 10-Year Challenge.
Theoretically, if Facebook had generated and used the 10-Year Challenge
as pretext to lure users into exposing their biometric data to Facebook’s
facial recognition software, then participating users would be disclosing
information that would have otherwise remained private but for Facebook’s
inducement. In other words, Facebook would have caused its users to
disclose their biometric information under false pretenses—regardless of
whether users actually realized what information they were disclosing. 310
While objectionable to some, this strategy does not implicate private tort
liability. The reason—consent.
Assuming a plaintiff can establish all the express elements of the
appropriation tort, 311 Facebook’s data policy 312 remains a viable means by
which Facebook can avoid liability. In fact, it is unlikely that the pretext
under which Facebook theoretically obtained the information negates users’
consent at all. First, some courts have explicitly found that consent obtained
under false pretenses does not invalidate otherwise valid consent. 313 More
important, however, is the context in which Facebook theoretically
manipulated its users into disclosing their personal information: Facebook
did not use pretext to obtain users’ consent; rather, it used pretext to obtain
the information. By using Facebook’s services, users consent to Facebook’s
data policy and thereby consent to any subsequent data collection. 314 The
consent subsists regardless of the circumstances under which the person
posts to the platform and covers every subsequent act of data collection.
Absent a major change in the law, Facebook and other data collectors
can skirt tort liability even when they manipulate users into disclosing
biometric information that would have otherwise remained private. In
See Anthony Cuthbertson, Most People Don’t Know About Facebook’s Invasive Data
Practices, Study Finds, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 17, 2019), https://ind.pn/2sBL4wC
310

[https://perma.cc/M2VU-BKQP] (reporting that a recent study found roughly seventy-five
percent of Facebook users do not know how Facebook collects and uses their data).
The express elements of an appropriation claim include: (1) the defendant appropriates
the name or likeness of the plaintiff; and (2) the defendant did so for his or her own use or
benefit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (AM. LAW INST. 1977); see also
supra Section III.A.1.
See Data Policy, supra note 24; see also supra notes 304–08 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Baugh v. CBS, Inc., 828 F. Supp. 745, 757 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (finding a plaintiff’s
“improperly induced” consent barred her claim for intrusion upon seclusion).
Consent to the data policy is a precondition to using Facebook’s platform; by using
Facebook’s services, users consent to the policy. See supra notes 304–08 and accompanying
text.
311

312
313

314
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efforts to curb biometric privacy intrusions, three states have enacted laws
that attempt to prevent biometric data-collection injuries but nevertheless
fall short of protecting against practices designed to manipulate consumers
into disclosing their information. The next section discusses those statutes.

B. Biometric Privacy in State Statutory Law
Illinois became the first state to enact a comprehensive biometric
privacy law in 2008. 315 Since then, only two other states—Texas and
Washington—have enacted biometric privacy laws of similar, albeit lesser,
magnitude. 316 Meanwhile, federal efforts have stagnated. 317 This section first
overviews the three state laws that directly address biometric privacy. It then
demonstrates how those laws fall short of protecting against pretextual
biometric data-collection techniques.

1. Statutory Protections at the State Level
a. Illinois
In 2008, Illinois enacted the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy
Act (BIPA) 318 to protect its citizens’ biometric information from data
collectors. In recent years, however, companies like Facebook have taken
steps to erode BIPA’s protections.

i. Overview of BIPA
BIPA has become known as the “archetype” of biometric privacy laws
for both its scope and enforcement provisions. 319 The statute’s legislative
See Jane Bambauer, Biometric Privacy Laws: How a Little-Known Illinois Law Made
Facebook Illegal 2 (2017), https://bit.ly/2GXl7Ag [https://perma.cc/6CUD-U4YU]
(unpublished manuscript) (crediting Illinois as the first state to pass a comprehensive
biometric privacy law). Other states have passed less-comprehensive biometric-privacy laws.
See id. at 2 n.1.
See infra Section III.B.1.
For example, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Consumer Privacy Protection Act of
2017, see S.2124, 115th Cong. (2017), which would have provided some federal protection
of consumers’ biometric data, on November 14, 2017. The bill did not make it out of the
Judiciary Committee. See S.2124—Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2017,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://bit.ly/2SVdwcL [https://perma.cc/5MVR-S6S2].
740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/1–14/99 (LexisNexis 2019).
See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 315, at 2 (“The archetype example of a biometric privacy
law is the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (‘BIPA’).”); Biometrics Laws and
Privacy Policies, PRIVACYPOLICIES.COM, https://bit.ly/2E5k4el [https://perma.cc/D38PJZ39] (“[BIPA is] the archetype of biometric privacy laws that other states—Texas and
Washington—would draw up on [sic] later.”).
315

316
317

318
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findings and intent demonstrate the Illinois legislature’s concerns over (1)
the growth in businesses that use biometric technology; 320 (2) the risk of harm
to which the technology exposes consumers and the anxiety resulting from
that risk; 321 and (3) the unknown ramifications of biometric technology. 322
Importantly, the Illinois General Assembly recognized that:
Biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers that are used to
access finances or other sensitive information. For example,
social security numbers, when compromised, can be changed.

Biometrics, however, are biologically unique to the individual;
therefore, once compromised, the individual has no recourse, is

at heightened risk for identity theft, and is likely to withdraw from
biometric-facilitated transactions. 323
BIPA prohibits individuals, businesses, and other groups from
collecting, capturing, purchasing, or otherwise obtaining a person’s
“biometric identifier” 324 or “biometric information,” 325 without first:
(1) inform[ing] the subject . . . in writing that a biometric identifier
or biometric information is being collected or stored;
(2) inform[ing] the subject . . . in writing of the specific purpose
and length of term for which a biometric identifier or biometric
information is being collected, stored, and used; and
(3) receiv[ing] a written release executed by the subject of the
biometric identifier or biometric information. 326
Additionally, BIPA strictly prohibits profiting off of another person’s
biometric data 327 and requires private actors to obtain express consent prior
to disseminating the biometric information they collect. 328 BIPA also
imposes rigorous data-protection obligations 329 and requires companies in
possession of such data to implement and disclose to the public their
retention policies. 330 Most notably, however, BIPA provides a private right

320

740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/5(a)–(b).

321

Id. 14/5(c)–(e).
Id. 14/5(f).
Id. 14/5(c) (emphasis added).

322
323

BIPA defines “biometric identifier” as “a retina or iris scan, fingerprint, voiceprint, or scan
of hand or face geometry.” Id. 14/10.
Under BIPA, the definition of “biometric information” includes “any information,
regardless of how it is captured, converted, stored, or shared, based on an individual’s
biometric identifier used to identify an individual.” Id.
Id. 14/15(b).
See id. 14/15(c).
See id. 14/15(d).
See id. 14/15(e).
See id. 14/15(a).
324

325

326
327
328
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of action for individuals harmed by violations of the statute, 331 awarding
$1000 in statutory damages for negligent violations 332 and $5000 in statutory
damages for intentional or reckless violations. 333

ii. Attacks on BIPA and Recent Litigation
Private companies have made several attempts to undermine and
seriously weaken BIPA’s protections. For instance, the New York Times
reported in 2016 that Facebook had launched the lobbying effort 334 behind
an amendment to BIPA that would have removed protections against facialrecognition scans and undercut then-ongoing litigation against Facebook
and other companies that violated BIPA in its original form. 335 Ultimately,
the bill’s author announced that he would not call for a vote after privacy
advocates and the Illinois Attorney General announced opposition to the
bill. 336 Nevertheless, Illinois state legislators continue to introduce bills that
would undermine BIPA’s protections. 337
In addition to mounting legislative challenges, BIPA’s opponents have
challenged the law in the courts. 338 Of all the rulings issued in BIPA litigation,
arguably the most consequential ruling was issued by the U.S. Court of
331
332
333
334

See id. 14/20.
See id. 14/20(1).
See id. 14/20(2).
See Conor Dougherty, Tech Companies Take Their Legislative Concerns to the States,

N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2016), https://nyti.ms/34fEMEm [https://perma.cc/NW2H-9WG6]
(“The amendment was lobbied for by Facebook . . . .”).
Adam Schwartz, The Danger of Corporate Facial Recognition Tech, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (June 7, 2016), https://bit.ly/2DbeDL6 [https://perma.cc/N3XR-WR2G]
[hereinafter Corporate Facial Recognition]. BIPA’s definition of “biometric identifier”
excludes “photographs” from the definition. See ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/10. Among
other substantive changes, the bill would have modified the word “photographs” with the
words “physical or digital” and would have therefore excluded protections for both physical
and digital photographs. See Letter from Privacy Groups to Sen. Terry Link, Ill. Gen.
Assemb. 2 (May 27, 2016), https://bit.ly/35sk2ta [https://perma.cc/6CN6-BK8W]. In
addition, the bill would have applied retroactively and therefore undercut claims in pending
BIPA litigation. See H.R. 6074, S. Amend. 1, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 5(h) (Ill.
2016).
Corporate Facial Recognition, supra note 335.
See, e.g., Adam Schwartz, New Attack on Illinois Biometric Privacy Act, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 10, 2018), https://bit.ly/2XQ83TP [https://perma.cc/Z56Z-LE3U].
See, e.g., Patel v. Facebook, 932 F.3d 1264, 1270–75 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding plaintiffs
suffered an injury-in-fact, and therefore had standing to sue, when Facebook allegedly
violated BIPA by not receiving the plaintiffs’ opt-in consent to Facebook’s use of facial
recognition technology); Rosenbach v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 2019 IL 123186, ¶¶ 19–33
(finding BIPA’s private right of action provisions apply even when the sole injury is a violation
of a person’s statutory rights).
335

336
337

338
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Patel v. Facebook. 339 The plaintiffs in Patel—
who were all Illinois residents—filed suit against Facebook alleging that
Facebook’s “Tag Suggestions” feature violated BIPA. 340 The feature, which
was enabled by default, used facial-recognition technology to detect whether
users’ faces appeared in images posted to Facebook’s platform. 341 The
plaintiffs argued that Facebook violated their rights under BIPA when
Facebook used facial-recognition technology on images displaying the
plaintiffs’ faces without first obtaining the plaintiffs’ opt-in consent. 342
Facebook moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for lack of Article III
standing, arguing that the plaintiffs had not alleged any concrete injury. 343
The district court denied Facebook’s motion, and Facebook appealed to
the Ninth Circuit. 344
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had pleaded a
concrete injury sufficient to confer standing to sue. 345 Specifically, the Ninth
Circuit found that the statutory violations alleged by the plaintiffs did not
constitute mere “procedural” violations but instead amounted to concrete
injuries-in-fact. 346 Drawing on the origins and development of the right to
privacy, in both the common-law and constitutional contexts, the Ninth
339

Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019).

Id. at 1268.
Id. at 1267–68.
See id. at 1268.
Id. at 1269. The standing doctrine is rooted in the “cases and controversies” clause of
Article III of the U.S. Constitution. See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).

340
341
342
343

Article III limits the power of federal courts to deciding “cases and controversies.” U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2. Over time, the Supreme Court has interpreted the clause to require
plaintiffs to establish “standing” to sue a defendant. See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547. The
standing doctrine requires, in part, that the plaintiff “suffered an injury in fact” which occurs
when the plaintiff “suffered ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and
particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’” Id. at 1547–48
(quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). In Spokeo v. Robinson,
the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff does not necessarily meet the “concrete injury”
requirement “whenever a statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize
that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Id. at 1549. “Bare procedural violation[s],” the
Court explained, cannot form the basis for standing if the procedural violation did not give
rise to an actual, concrete injury. Id. “In other words, for Article III purposes, it is not enough
for a plaintiff to allege that a defendant has violated a right created by a statute; we must still
ascertain whether the plaintiff suffered a concrete injury-in-fact due to the violation.” Patel,
932 F.3d at 1270. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit in Patel had to determine whether the
plaintiffs had alleged a “bare procedural violation” of BIPA or an actual, concrete injury. Id.
at 1270–71.
See Patel, 932 F.3dat 1269–70.
See id. at 1275.
See id. at 1271–74.
344
345
346
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Circuit found that the privacy interests protected by BIPA align with the
historic privacy interests protected in the common-law and FourthAmendment contexts. 347 The court drew heavily on the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Carpenter, finding many of the privacy concerns arising from
CSLI also arose in the biometric-privacy context and therefore implicate
“concrete interests in privacy” 348:
As in the Fourth Amendment context, the facial-recognition
technology at issue here can obtain information that is “detailed,
encyclopedic, and effortlessly compiled,” which would be almost
impossible without such technology. Once a face template of an
individual is created, Facebook can use it to identify that
individual in any of the other hundreds of millions of photos
uploaded to Facebook each day, as well as determine when the
individual was present at a specific location. Facebook can also
identify the individual’s Facebook friends or acquaintances who
are present in the photo. Taking into account the future
development of such technology as suggested in Carpenter, it
seems likely that a face-mapped individual could be identified
from a surveillance photo taken on the streets or in an office
building. Or a biometric face template could be used to unlock
the face recognition lock on that individual’s cell phone. We
conclude that the development of a face template using facialrecognition technology without consent (as alleged here) invades
an individual’s private affairs and concrete interests. Similar
conduct is actionable at common law. 349
The court in Patel concluded that Facebook’s alleged violations of
BIPA “necessarily violate the plaintiffs’ substantive privacy interests.” 350 The
plaintiffs had alleged that Facebook violated BIPA’s provisions by failing to
obtain written releases from each user prior to collecting, using, and storing
their biometric identifiers and was therefore able to create and use face
templates for each of the plaintiffs and to retain those templates for all
time. 351 The Ninth Circuit found that “[b]ecause the privacy right protected
347

See id. at 1273. Specifically, the court stated:

In light of this historical background and the Supreme Court’s views regarding
enhanced technological intrusions on the right to privacy, we conclude that an
invasion of an individual’s biometric privacy rights ‘has a close relationship to a
harm that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in
English or American courts.’
Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549).
Id. at 1274 (quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 1273 (quoting Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216 (2018)).
Id. at 1274.
348
349
350
351

Id.
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by BIPA is the right not to be subject to the collection and use of such
biometric data, Facebook’s alleged violation of these statutory requirements
would necessarily violate the plaintiffs’ substantive privacy interests.” 352
Accordingly, the court concluded, the Patel plaintiffs alleged a concrete
injury sufficient to establish Article III standing. 353

b. Texas
Texas became the second state to pass a biometric information privacy
law in 2009. 354 While the Texas statute bears many of the same
characteristics of BIPA, some have referred to the Texas law as “BIPA-lite”
for its lack of teeth. 355 Unlike BIPA, the Texas law does not create a private
right of action for violations of the statute 356 but instead permits the Texas
Attorney General to enforce the statute through civil actions. 357 And while
the Texas law requires notice and consent before a person may capture
another’s biometric identifiers, 358 it does not require a written release. 359 In
addition, unlike BIPA, the Texas statute does not prohibit people from
profiting off of the sale of someone else’s biometric information. 360

c. Washington
Enacted in 2017, the Washington State biometric privacy law 361 aims to
protect consumers from businesses that collect biometric information
without first receiving consumers’ consent. 362 Much like the Texas law,
Id.
Id.
See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (2017).
See John G. Browning, The Battle Over Biometrics, 81 TEX. B.J. 674, 676 (2018).
See id.
See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(d) (2017). The statute provides that the
Texas Attorney General may obtain up to $25,000 per violation in damages. See id.
Id. § 503.001(b)–(c). These notice and consent requirements, however, only apply to

352
353
354
355
356
357

358

instances where the person capturing or possessing the information does so for a
“commercial purpose.” See id.
See Browning, supra note 355, at 676.
See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (2017).
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.375.010–.040 (LexisNexis 2019).
See id. § 19.375.900. In the law’s finding and intent section, the legislature noted:
[The] citizens of Washington are increasingly asked to disclose sensitive
biological information that uniquely identifies them for commerce, security, and
convenience. The collection and marketing of biometric information about
individuals, without consent or knowledge of the individual whose data is
collected, is of increasing concern. The legislature intends to require a business
that collects and can attribute biometric data to a specific uniquely identified
individual to disclose how it uses that biometric data, and provide notice to and
359
360
361
362
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however, the Washington law does not create a private right of action but
instead delegates enforcement to the Washington State Attorney General
through the state’s consumer protection act 363 and does not require written
consent. 364 The law, which only covers commercial uses of biometric
identifiers, 365 prohibits the collection of a person’s biometric identifiers “in
a database for a commercial purpose” without first providing notice to and
obtaining consent from that person. 366 The Washington law also requires
companies to obtain consent before selling, leasing, or otherwise disclosing
a person’s biometric identifiers absent specific, unique circumstances. 367
Despite its similarities to the Texas law, the Washington law arguably
provides less protection than its counterparts. When the Washington bill
was originally introduced, it provided fairly robust biometric-privacy
protections, including protections against surreptitious collection of
biometric information through facial recognition technology. 368 The bill’s

obtain consent from an individual before enrolling or changing the use of that
individual’s biometric identifiers in a database.

Id.
See id. § 19.375.030(2).
See Browning, supra note 355, at 676.
See generally WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.020 (LexisNexis 2019). The law defines
363
364
365

“biometric identifier” as “data generated by automatic measurements of an individual’s
biological characteristics, such as a fingerprint, voiceprint, eye retinas, irises, or other unique
biological patterns or characteristics that is used to identify a specific individual.” Id. §
19.375.010(1).
Id. § 19.375.020(1).
See id. § 19.375.020(3). Those circumstances include instances where disclosure:
(b) Is necessary to provide a product or service subscribed to, requested, or
expressly authorized by the individual;
(c) Is necessary to effect, administer, enforce, or complete a financial transaction
that the individual requested, initiated, or authorized, and the third party to
whom the biometric identifier is disclosed maintains confidentiality of the
biometric identifier and does not further disclose the biometric identifier except
as otherwise permitted . . . ;
(d) Is required or expressly authorized by a federal or state statute, or court
order;
(e) Is made to a third party who contractually promises that the biometric
identifier will not be further disclosed and will not be enrolled in a database for
a commercial purpose inconsistent with the notice and consent described in [the
statute]; or
(f) Is made to prepare for litigation or to respond to or participate in judicial
process.
366
367

Id.
See H.R. 1094, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1(4) (Wash. 2015). Specifically, the original bill’s
368

definition of “biometric identifier” included “less sensitive identifiers, including, but not
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final form, however, included no reference to facial-recognition
technology 369 and excluded some of the most troubling aspects of biometric
identification. 370

2. Applicability of State Statutes to the 10-Year Challenge
While the state biometric-privacy laws discussed above provide
additional protections to consumers, the laws nevertheless fall short of
protecting consumers against pretextual-collection tactics, such as those
limited to facial imaging, voice, and gait when used specifically for identification purposes.”

Id.
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.010(1) (LexisNexis 2019). The final legislation
369

defined “biometric identifier,” in its entirety, as follows:
“Biometric identifier” means data generated by automatic measurements of an
individual’s biological characteristics, such as a fingerprint, voiceprint, eye
retinas, irises, or other unique biological patterns or characteristics that is used
to identify a specific individual. “Biometric identifier” does not include a

physical or digital photograph, video or audio recording or data generated
therefrom, or information collected, used, or stored for health care treatment,
payment, or operations under the federal health insurance portability and
accountability act of 1996.
Id. (emphasis added).
For example, in a letter of opposition to a later form of the Washington bill, the Electronic
Frontier Foundation raised the following concerns:
It appears that the bill would not address ordinary people’s concern about surreptitious
collection of biometric information in commercial venues. A shopping mall could, with
impunity, face-scan or iris-scan mall visitors for marketing purposes because the mall visitors
would not be “access[ing] a system or account.” We think most people would be surprised
that the bill excludes such biometric collection. Moreover, the mall apparently would have
no duty of reasonable care under Sec. 4(a). We are also concerned that this limited
definition, combined with Sec. 4 of the bill (enforcement by attorney general under state
consumer protection law), will be taken to mean that the legislature is comfortable with all
other biometric collection.
Letter from Lee Tien, Senior Staff Attorney, Elec. Frontier Found., to Rep. Mark
Hemsworth, Wash. House of Representatives, and Rep. Jeff Morris, Wash. House of
Representatives (Feb. 22, 2016), https://bit.ly/2KN769b [https://perma.cc/7J8D-GGEL].
The Washington law’s definition of “biometric identifier” no longer limits its coverage of
collection of biometric data to instances where an individual “accesses a system or account.”
Compare H.R. 1094, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 3(2) (Wash. 2016) (“‘Biometric identifier’”
means data generated by automatic measurements of an individual’s biological characteristics
. . . [used to] authenticate an individual’s identity when the individual accesses a system or
account.”), with WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.010(1) (LexisNexis 2019). Nevertheless,
the current form of the law excludes from the definition “a physical or digital photograph,
video or audio recording or data generated therefrom” and makes no express reference to
facial recognition technology. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.010(1) (LexisNexis
2019).
370
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hypothetically behind the 10-Year Challenge. 371 The notice and consent
provisions are the major force behind these laws, yet protections that hinge
on consent often fall short. 372 When consumers consent to surrendering
their data before starting to use a third party’s service, they agree to
continually surrender their personal information to that third party each
time they use the service. Thus, each disclosure is based, at least in theory,
on the consumer’s own volition and uninhibited choice. That dynamic
changes, however, when the party seeking the information pretextually
inserts itself into the consumer’s decision-making process. Because the
statutory consent provisions permit businesses to use one-time consent as a
license to all subsequent data gathering, nothing prevents companies from
luring (or even compelling) otherwise private information into the public
sphere.
Moreover, even if the statutes prohibited pretextual-collection tactics,
the statutes hardly deter companies from engaging in this type of behavior.
While citizens of Illinois may seek relief through private suits, citizens of
Texas and Washington are forced to rely on government enforcement,
which is often limited by constrained resources and enforcement
priorities. 373 The inherent problems of this patchwork approach to biometric
privacy necessitate a federal solution.
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION
The privacy implications of biometrics extend beyond expectations of
privacy in one’s facial geometry or fingerprint pattern. 374 In 2007, the U.S.
government acknowledged that a person’s biometric information “can be
used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity.” 375 Today, both private
and state actors increasingly use biometrics both to identify and to verify
individuals’ identities: 376 banks have begun using facial recognition instead of
PIN numbers and passwords to provide access to customers’ bank

371
372
373

See supra notes 3–12 and accompanying text.
See supra Section III.A.1.d.
See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“The aggregation of

individual claims in the context of a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the existence
of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government.”).
See supra notes 76–96 and accompanying text.
OMB MEMO, supra note 21, at 1 n.1.
See Danny Thakkar, Global Biometric Market Analysis: Trends and Future Prospects,
BAYOMETRIC, https://bit.ly/2VhxevQ [https://perma.cc/QN8L-CLKA].
374
375
376
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accounts 377 and digital wallets, such as Apple Pay, 378 use fingerprint and facial
scans to authorize payments. 379 But some companies have gone beyond
using biometrics to ensure the security of information and have instead
begun trading biometric information as a commodity. 380 Researchers even
predict that marketers could one day use facial recognition technology to
identify a person on the street and instantaneously retrieve that person’s
credit score. 381 Much like blood and DNA samples, as well as CSLI, 382 facial
biometrics can reveal a wide swath of intimate information about a person,
and the potential for misuse or mishandling of that information “may result
in anxiety for the person” to whom the information is connected. 383 That
anxiety may only be exacerbated by recent upticks in large-scale data
breaches 384 and the proliferation of “lower cost biometric handheld devices
[that] now make it possible to obtain rapid identification virtually
anywhere.” 385
Today’s online society has made biometric data collection inevitable,
reinforced by the unequal bargaining relationship between consumers and

See Jeanne Lee, More Banks Turn to Biometrics to Keep an Eye on Security,
NERDWALLET (May 20, 2016), https://bit.ly/22mfaP9 [https://perma.cc/6ZVR-89XP].
Apply Pay is a mobile payment app that allows users to make contact-less payments. See
Pay, APPLE PAY, https://apple.co/1rmmha4 [https://perma.cc/8W6G-2X55].
See Biometrics: Are Fingerprint ID and Facial Recognition Secure?, FIREFLY CREDIT
UNION:
LIFE
ILLUMINATED
(Jan.
30,
2019),
https://bit.ly/2NqCZER
[https://perma.cc/8NNY-9HYQ].
See supra notes 76–96 and accompanying text.
See Natasha Singer, Face Recognition Makes the Leap from Sci-Fi, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 12,
2011), https://nyti.ms/2SVfGcn [https://perma.cc/4HYZ-URTL]. In a 2011 study, for
example, researchers at Carnegie Mellon University used “off-the-shelf facial recognition
software” to identify anonymous college students by comparing photographs of those
students to photographs publicly available on Facebook. Id. The researchers then used the
information available on some students’ Facebook profiles to identify their interests and
predict parts of their social security numbers. Id.
See supra Section II.B.3.
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016).
See Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as
Fallout Widens, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 19, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2HP4Dr3
[https://perma.cc/28S5-D5ZA] (reporting that a political data firm gained access to more than
50 million Facebook users’ private information and had tools to influence voter behavior);
Brian Fung, Equifax’s Massive 2017 Data Breach Keeps Getting Worse, WASH. POST (Mar.
1, 2018), https://wapo.st/2U5aQWr [https://perma.cc/K3BU-H9J2] (reporting that as many
as 147.9 million people may have been affected by the 2017 Equifax data breach, which
revealed partial driver’s license data of consumers).
NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS & IDENTITY MGMT., THE
NATIONAL BIOMETRICS CHALLENGE 19 (Sept. 2011).
377

378

379

380
381

382
383
384
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the companies that traffic in biometrics. 386 While many companies collect
biometric information for the limited purpose of providing verification
technology, many others collect that information to monetize their
consumers’ personal identities. 387 In fact, personal information has now, in
many instances, replaced cash payments, causing many consumers to
believe that the services they use each day are “free.” 388 To use the services
that these companies provide, participating consumers have no option but
to agree—through carefully crafted terms-of-service agreements—to hand
over their personal information. But whereas consumers in the past knew
what they were giving up in return for a good or service (i.e., money),
consumers of these so-called “free” services often do not realize that they
are in fact making payment with their personal information, an arguably
much more valuable and risky form of contractual consideration. 389 And as
technology continues to pervade every aspect of modern life, consumers will
only become more dependent on these services, making life in the modern
world without constantly surrendering personal information nearly
impossible. 390
See A REVIEW OF THE DATA BROKER INDUSTRY, supra note 84, at 1–2 (discussing the
recent societal shift toward conducting everyday activities on the Internet).
See McKenna, supra note 78, at 1067–68. According to Facebook’s CEO, Mark
Zuckerberg, Facebook does not sell its users’ data, despite reports to the contrary. See Mark
Zuckerberg, The Facts About Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://on.wsj.com/33z0nGz [https://perma.cc/EN5R-PB8N].
See Will Oremus, Are You Really the Product?, SLATE (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://bit.ly/34B7OP1 [https://perma.cc/9MYV-RDU5]. Mark Zuckerberg explained the
payment dynamic in a Wall Street Journal op-ed:
[B]ased on what pages people like, what they click on, and other signals, we create
categories—for example, people who like pages about gardening and live in Spain—and then
charge advertisers to show ads to that category. Although advertising to specific groups existed
well before the internet, online advertising allows much more precise targeting and therefore
more-relevant ads. . . . In an ordinary transaction, you pay a company for a product or service
they provide. Here you get our services for free—and we work separately with advertisers to
show you relevant ads.
Zuckerberg, supra note 387.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS 25–28 (Dec.
2010), https://bit.ly/34C8pzQ [https://perma.cc/RSR7-SFXU] [hereinafter FTC PROPOSED
FRAMEWORK] (“[M]any data collection and use practices are invisible to consumers. . . .
[C]onsumers often do not understand the extent to which their data is shared with third
parties.”); McKenna, supra note 78, at 1067–68, 1076.
Accord Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) (“[C]ell phones and the
services they provide are ‘such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life’ that carrying one is
indispensable to participation in modern society.” (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373,
385 (2014))).
386

387
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This type of arbitrary power, used to exploit an already unequal
bargaining relationship, is ripe for federal constraints. Common-law
remedies have not kept up with technology in protecting privacy interests. 391
And while a few state laws provide some additional protections, those
protections do not cross state borders and are based on archaic
understandings of consent that fail to prevent businesses from manipulating
consumers into disclosing information that they would have otherwise kept
private. Even broader federal consumer-protection laws fail to prevent this
type of dubious conduct. 392
While the Fourth Amendment’s approach to privacy and modern
technology can provide guidance in this area, 393 Fourth-Amendment
precepts—namely, the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test—fall short of
providing a biometric-privacy solution. The Government’s ability to collect
private information is limited by a person’s reasonable expectations of
privacy. 394 On the other hand, absent industry-specific legislation, the only
restraints on private industry’s ability to collect biometric information are
contractual arrangements between companies and consumers. 395 Those
contractual arrangements, however, arise from unequal bargaining
relationships in which the consumer must choose either to accept the terms
or to forgo the service. At the same time, many consumers are unaware both
that private companies are handling their biometric information and, more
importantly, of the breadth of information that biometrics can reveal about
them. 396 Moreover, most of those agreements do not contemplate limitations
on the company’s access to the information or the methods by which the
company can gather the information. Accordingly, companies can use any
methods they deem fit to compel consumers to disclose their information—
391
392

See supra Section III.A.
See FTC PROPOSED FRAMEWORK, supra note 389, at 19–20. Although the FTC Act

prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce” and provides the
FTC with enforcement authority for FTC Act violations, see 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018), the FTC
has acknowledged “limitations” in its approach to privacy-based harms. See FTC PROPOSED
FRAMEWORK, supra note 389, at 19–20.
See supra Section II.B.3.
See supra Section II.B.2–3.
See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 786–90 (discussing the United States’
“sectoral approach” to consumer privacy).
Consumer privacy in the United States is regulated by ‘sectoral’ laws that focus on various
sectors of the economy. Different laws regulate different industries. In contrast to the United
States, Europe and many other countries have an ‘omnibus’ approach toward regulating
privacy. Under an omnibus approach, one overarching statute regulates personal information
use irrespective of the entities or industry that wishes to process the information.
Id. at 786.
See Cuthbertson, supra note 310; see also supra Section I.B.
393
394
395

396
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even manipulation. Each of these layers coalesce into a dynamic that
undercuts application of the reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test in favor
of less privacy.
The federal government has begun taking steps toward protecting
biometric-information privacy through federal legislation. 397 While those
efforts are laudable, it is important for the federal response to fill the gaps
in the current state statutory schemes. 398 A federal response to appropriation
by manipulation would not be the first time that the federal government has
addressed such dubious behavior. For instance, in 2006, the federal
government enacted the Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of
2006 (TRPPA), 399 which prohibits people from “knowingly and intentionally
obtain[ing], or attempt[ing] to obtain, confidential phone records
information” from telecommunication providers “by (1) making false or
fraudulent statements or representations to an employee of a
[telecommunications provider]; [or] (2) making such false or fraudulent
statements or representations to a customer of a [telecommunications
provider].” 400 The concern that Congress sought to address at the time was
a practice known as “pretexting.” 401
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “pretext” as “[a] false or weak reason
or motive advanced to hide actual or strong reason or motive.” 402 The
concept of “pretexting” reached the public’s consciousness in 2006 after
news of a spying scandal involving Hewlett-Packard broke. 403 The reports
described actions taken by Hewlett-Packard’s board of directors to identify
the source of an information leak. 404 According to the reports, HewlettSee, e.g., Personal Data Notification and Protection Act of 2017, H.R. 3806, 115th Cong.
(2017); Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2017, S. 2125, 115th Cong. (2017); H.R. 3816,
115th Cong. (2017).
At the same time, however, the federal response should not preempt state laws designed
to protect biometric privacy, as some of the introduced federal legislation attempts to do. See
American Data Dissemination Act of 2019, S. 142, 116th Cong. (2019).
Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-476, 120 Stat.
3568 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
18 U.S.C. § 1039(a)(1)–(2) (2018).
See Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-476 §
2(4)(B), 120 Stat. 3568.
See Pretext, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 1999); see also Pretext, BALLENTINE’S
LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1969) (defining “pretext” as “[a]n ostensible reason or motive
assigned or assumed as a color or cover for the real reason or motive; false appearance;
pretense”).
See David A. Kaplan, Suspicions and Spies in Silicon Valley, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 17, 2006),
https://bit.ly/37nWQhh [https://perma.cc/V5VW-YZR3] (breaking the news of the HewlettPackard spying scandal).
397

398

399

400
401

402

403

404

See id.
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Packard admitted that the board launched an investigation into the leaks,
which included obtaining the phone records of board members and
journalists by impersonation. 405
The United States House Committee on Energy and Commerce
(“Committee”) launched an investigation into Hewlett-Packard’s actions
shortly after the news broke. 406 During Committee hearings, members of the
Committee made clear the implications of this type of activity in terms of
both the general privacy concerns and the ramifications of these types of
privacy intrusions:
To be clear what we are talking about, pretexting, or “social
engineering,” means using fraud, deceit, and impersonation to
acquire someone’s personal records without his consent. In this
high-tech age, personal information is not only valuable, but
vulnerable, and the relative ease with which unscrupulous
pretexters can literally con their way into our personal lives is
cause for great concern. 407
The Committee also acknowledged and expressed surprise that the
broader federal consumer protection laws—namely, Section 5 of the FTC
Act—shielded against these types of acts but nevertheless failed to deter
wrongdoers due to a lack of explicit statutory prohibitions:
The FTC had successfully brought pretexting cases under its
Section 5 authority which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts and
practices. You would have thought that that would have set the
stage for understanding that this is not a legal act. A number of
States, including my home State of Illinois, under our Attorney
General Lisa Madigan, used their general consumer protection
and consumer fraud statutes to file suits against the practice, and
now, along with 11 other States, Illinois has passed a law. But
obviously there are still those who missed the point and choose
to dabble in what they claim is a grey area of the law. 408
The Committee’s Hewlett-Packard hearings ultimately served as the
catalyst for the TRPPA’s passage. 409 In the TRPPA’s congressional findings,
Congress noted that:
See Scott Horsley, Dunn, Others Charged in HP Spying Case, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct.
4, 2006), https://n.pr/2OxregC [https://perma.cc/C6V7-RR68].
See James S. Granelli, HP’s CEO Offers to Testify to Congress About Spying Scandal,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2006), https://lat.ms/2rVnJsM [https://perma.cc/XW44-AAUB].
405

406

Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight &
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 109th Cong. 3 (2006) (statement

407

of Rep. Ed Whitfield, Chairman, Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations).
Id. at 17 (statement of Rep. Schakowsky).
See Kim Zetter, First ‘Pretexting’ Charges Filed Under Law Passed After HP Spy Scandal,
WIRED (Jan. 9, 2009), https://bit.ly/33EArJv [https://perma.cc/TNJ3-AMQZ]. The House
408
409
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[T]elephone records have been obtained without the knowledge
or consent of consumers through the use of a number of
fraudulent methods and devices that include . . . ‘‘pretexting’’,
whereby a data broker or other person represents that they are
an authorized consumer and convinces an agent of the telephone
company to release the data. 410
Congress’s response to the pretexting problem can guide federal
legislation addressing future manipulative collection tactics employed by
biometric-data collectors. 411 Like an individual who seeks to obtain
telephone records by impersonating an authorized consumer, companies
seeking to obtain consumers’ biometric data under false pretenses cause
otherwise private information to be revealed through manipulation.
The current problem, however, raises a dilemma not present in 2006—
consent. Consider the 10-Year Challenge. While pretexting occurs without
the information owner’s consent, Facebook’s theoretical acquisition of
users’ information occurred after the users consented to Facebook’s data
policy. This distinction clearly complicates the comparison. The federal
response must therefore reconceptualize how consumers consent to
biometric data-collection practices. The validity of consent to biometric data
collection should account not only for the company’s ability to collect
consumers’ data but also for the context in which that data is made available
to the company. For example, a BIPA-compliant consent agreement may
suffice when consumers disclose biometric information strictly by their own
volition. 412 However, if a company initiates pretextual campaigns or other
strategies to lure users into disclosing biometric information, then the
company should be required to again (1) notify its consumers of its datacollection practices and (2) seek its consumers’ consent to collect that
information on a per-capture basis.

of Representatives passed the bill in April 2006, but the Senate initially made no progress on
the bill. See H.R.4709 - Telephone Records and Privacy Protection Act of 2006,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://bit.ly/37SRISN [https://perma.cc/U33Z-BPTB] (follow “Actions”
hyperlink). Three months after reports of Hewlett-Packard’s pretexting scandal broke,
however, the Senate unanimously passed the bill. See id.
410

Id.

The pretexting example is admittedly imperfect. Pretexting involves a third party contacting
another third party to obtain an individual’s records by impersonating that individual.
Appropriation by manipulation, on the other hand, involves a third party using false
pretenses to coax a consumer into disclosing his or her private information. Nevertheless,
both actions involve some level of deceit by the wrongdoer to obtain otherwise private
information. The remedies set forth below are meant to account for the defects in the
comparison. See infra notes 413–15 and accompanying text.
See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
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The consequences for failure to comply with these requirements
should not carry the same weight as the consequences attached to the
TRPPA. 413 While using manipulative tactics to lure disclosure of biometric
information is suspect and certainly amounts to an invasion of privacy, this
type of act does not measure up to the level of fraud inherent in the
pretexting scandal and should therefore not be treated as a criminal act. 414
Instead, the consequences should aim to promote responsible datagathering, -storage, and -use practices without stifling innovation.
Accordingly, the legislation should provide a private cause of action to
injured consumers. And because damages may be uncertain, 415 the
legislation should provide for statutory damages. By empowering the
plaintiffs’ bar to pursue these types of actions, companies should
theoretically be more willing to comply with the requirements and, in turn,
consumers may become more aware that they are disclosing sensitive
information.
VI. CONCLUSION
While O’Neill’s semi-sarcastic 416 concerns over the 10-Year
Challenge’s implications may have not accurately reflected the reality of
Facebook’s role in the challenge’s inception, 417 the op-ed nevertheless shines
light on some of the gaps in U.S. privacy law. Current U.S. laws do not
adequately protect consumers’ biometric information, despite the
information’s highly sensitive and private nature. Even laws containing
relatively robust notice and consent provisions permit biometric data
collectors to exploit the U.S. legal system’s current understanding of
“consent” by luring consumers into disclosing information that they would
have retained but-for the data collector’s actions. Any attempts at
comprehensive federal legislation should account for these concerns.

Violations of the TRPPA carry criminal penalties, including fines, imprisonment up to ten
years, or both. See 18 U.S.C. § 1039(a).
On the other hand, there are instances where taking such actions could warrant criminal
charges. Those types of situations, however, are not contemplated in the hypothetical
scenarios set forth in this Article.
See, e.g., Kehoe v. Fid. Fed. Bank & Trust, 421 F.3d 1209, 1213 (11th Cir. 2005)
(“Damages for a violation of an individual’s privacy are a quintessential example of damages
that are uncertain and possibly unmeasurable.”).
See O’Neill, supra note 5 (explaining that O’Neill’s argument originated from a “semisarcastic tweet”).
See Facebook Response, supra note 9 (“The 10 year challenge is a user-generated meme
that started on its own, without our involvement. It’s evidence of the fun people have on
Facebook, and that’s it.”).
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